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DEMOCRACY IN RURAL AMERICA*
RICK SU**
The conventional wisdom is that rural America has an outsized influence on
American politics. Yet, rural residents increasingly feel disempowered, devalued,
and divorced from the policy decisions that affect their everyday lives. This
Article argues that this widespread political disaffection cannot be entirely
explained by rural decline. Such disaffection is also the product of how rural local
governments are legally constructed in American law. Focusing on counties and
towns, this Article reveals the legal developments that have made these entities
poor vehicles for democratic empowerment. It also shows the extent to which the
role of counties and towns in rural governance has been displaced by the federal
government and the states. The result is that rural residents are not only denied
avenues for local self-governance in ways that are different from their urban
counterparts, they are also limited in their ability to respond collectively to the
challenges facing their communities. From this perspective, addressing the crisis
in rural America will require attention be paid to the crisis of rural democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Every presidential election in America has a theme, and these themes tend
to revolve around different segments of the American population. 1996 was the
year of the soccer mom.1 2004 centered on the NASCAR dad.2 In 2016,
however, no group seemed more instrumental in deciding the election than the
disaffected rural voter.3 To be sure, rural America has long played a central role
in presidential politics; every four years, it seems, candidates and reporters
venture out from cities in search of small-town values and simple country living.
Yet what they uncovered in the last election deviated from the traditional script.
Rural America seemed beset by “urban” problems. Abandoned houses and
storefronts dot the rural landscape.4 Factories are leaving and, with them, good
jobs and prospects for economic security.5 Vital institutions like churches, civic
organizations, and the nuclear family are showing signs of strain.6 Even the

1. See, e.g., Chapman Rackaway, Soccer Moms, Hockey Moms, National Security Moms: Reality
Versus Fiction and the Female Voter, in WOMEN AND THE WHITE HOUSE: GENDER, POPULAR
CULTURE, AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 75, 83–85 (Justin S. Vaughn & Lilly J. Goren eds., 2013).
2. See id. at 81–82.
3. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller Evich, Revenge of the Rural Voter, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/hillary-clinton-rural-voters-trump-231266
[https://perma.cc/T8GC-ZV4J]; Robert Leonard, Opinion, Why Rural America Voted for Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/why-rural-america-voted-fortrump.html [https://perma.cc/J8LZ-QTR2 (dark archive)].
4. See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 188 (2018); Alana
Semuels,
Ghost
Towns
of
the
21st
Century,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
20,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/ghost-towns-of-the-21st-century/411343/
[https://perma.cc/X59B-JFPD (dark archive)].
5. See Semuels, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON’T: POVERTY,
MORALITY, AND FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA 10–11, 106–09 (2009); Janet Adamy & Paul Overberg,
Rural America Is the New ‘Inner City,’ WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ruralamerica-is-the-new-inner-city-1495817008 [https://perma.cc/Q8XG-4F9U (dark archive)]; Mike
Kilen, Why Fewer Rural Iowans Are Going to Church, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2015/10/23/christian-churches-face-decline-ruraliowa/73993340/ [https://perma.cc/L3QA-ATCM].
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scourge of drugs—long a hallmark of urban dysfunction—is fast becoming a
symbol of rural decline.7
Rural plight is one of the central issues facing America today. Rural
grievances are also reshaping the partisan landscape of American politics.8
Concerns are now being raised about the effect of these rural developments on
the state of American democracy.9 Yet what does all of this say about the state
of democracy in rural America? The rise of the Tea Party and the election of
President Donald J. Trump provide only a partial picture. Equally important is
the extent to which democratic participation and community self-determination
are still possible in the counties and towns that govern our rural areas. In his
famed treatise on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville celebrated the
energy and spirit that he encountered in rural communities.10 It was in these
places, and not the big cities, that he believed one finds the foundation of
American democracy.11 But how has that energy and spirit held up over the
years? And what faith do we still have in rural democracy and local
policymaking by rural residents?
This Article is on local governments in rural America. More specifically,
it focuses on the counties and towns that govern rural areas. It argues that rural
communities currently lack the power to address many of the challenges they
face today and that this powerlessness is rooted in the manner in which rural
local governments are defined in American law. Their political organization and
legal construction make them poor vehicles for democratic empowerment.12
Their jurisdictions are often too large or artificially constructed to serve as bona
fide representatives of rural communities.13 Their long-standing status as
administrative subdivisions of the state—and increasingly administrative

7. See, e.g., Chris McGreal, America’s Poorest White Town: Abandoned by Coal, Swallowed by Drugs,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/12/beattyvillekentucky-and-americas-poorest-towns [https://perma.cc/H2QM-F7UG]; Haeyoun Park & Matthew
Bloch, How the Epidemic of Drug Overdose Deaths Rippled Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/07/us/drug-overdose-deaths-in-the-us.html
[https://perma.cc/NG44-93GU (dark archive)] (“In fact, death rates from overdoses in rural areas now
outpace the rate in large metropolitan areas, which historically had higher rates.”).
8. See Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, For Both Parties, a Political Realignment Along Cultural
Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/elections-dividednation.html [https://perma.cc/R4M7-WU42 (dark archive)].
9. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 2–3, 10 (2018); William A. Galston, The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-populist-challenge-to-liberaldemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/A2UE-LN2S].
10. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55–56 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d
American ed. New York, Adlard 1839).
11. Id. at 288–89.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Section II.A.
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apparatuses of the federal government14—undermines their ability to serve as
forums for robust political negotiations.15 Rural local governments are also
commonly denied the power and authority to pursue tailored and innovative
policies on their own, especially in a way that makes democratic participation
meaningful.16 All of this explains why, even as attention to rural suffering grows,
so little attention is paid to how rural local governments might respond. These
limitations also suggest why rural politics today are driven to such a large degree
by antigovernment sentiment and anti-establishment fervor, especially when
translated onto the national stage.
At the most basic level, this Article expands the current focus of local
government law. There are nearly 39,000 local governments in the United
States.17 But looking at the dearth of existing literature, one might come to
believe that there are only a handful. Cities, particularly the nation’s largest,
dominate the conversation. As a result, the study of local government law can
sometimes feel like a series of case studies of New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. If smaller localities are considered, they are mostly those in the
suburbs surrounding these major cities. If local governments other than
municipalities are examined, it is primarily the county governments that make
up our metropolitan regions. Of course, America is an urban country; more than
eighty percent of all Americans live in urbanized areas in or around a city
center.18 The emphasis on these areas, however, means that we often overlook
those who live beyond the metropolitan fringe. By focusing on cities, we tend
to neglect other local government forms, like counties and towns.19 It is these
institutions that dominate local governance in rural areas. Yet we know so little
about them and the role they play in the lives of rural residents.
At a deeper level, this Article is about our understanding of American
democracy. For too long, legal scholars and political theorists have assessed the

14. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 994
(2010) (“[Counties] serve as the only general purpose local government for unincorporated areas, the
second level of general purpose local government for incorporated areas, administrative subdivisions of
state government, and bureaucratic units for the delivery of federal services.”).
15. See infra Section III.C.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Carma Hogue, Government Organization Summary Report: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2013), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf
[perma.cc/FMP8-5EEU]. The count here refers to general-purpose local governments like cities,
towns, and counties. If special-purpose local governments like school districts, public authorities, and
special districts are included, the number climbs to over 90,000. See id.
18. New Census Data Show Differences Between Urban and Rural Populations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Dec.
8,
2016),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.html
[https://perma.cc/TD9U-PL9R].
19. I use towns in this Article to refer to both towns and townships, with a particular focus on
those that are unincorporated.
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prospect for “strong democracy”20 by invoking models of rural or small-town
governance.21 These accounts draw upon the sociological distinction between
“gesellschaft” societies based on impersonal ties and “gemeinschaft”
communities based on interpersonal relationships.22 The tendency is to
romanticize rural governance by invoking Tocquevillian mythologies of town
hall meetings and Jeffersonian visions of yeoman republics.23 Yet little attention
is paid to whether the rural communities upheld as models of democratic
participation actually function in that manner. Even less focus is directed
towards whether rural local governments offer a means by which community
sentiments can be translated into tangible actions. This Article suggests that the
legal organization of counties and towns across America may not be as
democratic as we commonly assume. And the consequences of this are not
limited to the current rural crisis and the political response; it also has
implications for American democracy as a whole.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I outlines the plight of rural
America. Parts II and III provide a legal and historical account of why rural
local governments are organized as powerless administrative subdivisions and
the doctrinal developments that led to this organization. Part II illustrates how
the romantic vision of rural democracy that dominates political theories does
not reflect the institutional and legal structure of rural local government in
American law or its development over the years. Part III examines how the role
of rural local governments is constrained by their relationship with the state and
federal government, both of which have expanded their involvement in rural
governance in recent decades. Part IV seeks to begin a conversation on whether
rural democracy might be revived by expanding the role of rural local
governments.
Before proceeding, a note on the scope of the subject may be necessary. I
focus here on local governments in rural America. I acknowledge, however, that
there is considerable debate over what counts as rural. For many of the
statistical trends, I use the census definition common in quantitative studies.
The census defines certain parts of the country as “urbanized areas”; those not

20. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 117 (2003).
21. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 252–62 (1963); LEWIS MUMFORD, THE
CULTURE OF CITIES 483–84 (1938); see also Garrett Dash Nelson, “The Town Was Us”: How the New
England Town Became the Mythical Landscape of American Democracy, PLACES (July 2018),
https://placesjournal.org/article/the-town-was-us/ [https://perma.cc/78GU-HS5M (staff-uploaded
archive)].
22. See, e.g., CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL
REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S 2 (1990).
23. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, THE REBIRTH OF
URBAN DEMOCRACY 1, 3–4 (1993).
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so designated are often considered to be “rural.”24 While this differentiation is
useful in the aggregate, “urbanized areas” often include many communities that
are considered by their residents and the general public to be “rural.”25 As a
result, to better capture the rural identity that has emerged, I draw examples
from “rural” communities that may not be recognized as such by census
administrators. I do not distinguish between urban and rural areas on the basis
of their local economies (i.e., agricultural or manufacturing) or socioeconomic
profiles (i.e., class inequality or racial diversity). As will be clear soon, the
erosion of these divides is an important part of the transformation giving rise
to the new rural America.
I. DECLINE AND DISAFFECTION IN RURAL AMERICA
Rural America faces a number of challenges. One such challenge, I argue, is
a crisis of democracy. By democracy, I am referring to the kind of “participatory
democracy” in which ordinary citizens are empowered to set the political
agenda, deliberate about possible solutions, and respond collectively through
governmental action.26 The crisis stems from the fact that most rural residents
are denied this kind of participation at precisely the level where it is most likely
to occur: the local governments that serve their communities. In Part II, I
outline the legal developments responsible for this state of affairs. The goal here
is to detail why democracy, and the democratic capacity of local governments
in particular, is useful for understanding the plight of rural America today.
I make three claims. First, the trouble with rural America lies not only in
its decline but also in the political disaffection now widespread among rural
residents. Second, this political disaffection reflects a democratic deficit in how
rural residents participate in the governance of their communities. Third, the
roots of that democratic deficit lie in the legal structure of rural local
governments. None of this is to suggest that ongoing efforts to assist rural
communities at the state and federal level are not important or worthwhile. But
rural residents need more than just help. They also need the power to help
themselves.
24. See Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/acs/acsgeo-1.html
[https://perma.cc/KE4LGZYW].
25. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 177–79 (2006).
26. See, e.g., MICHAEL MENSER, WE DECIDE!: THEORIES AND CASES IN PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY 11 (2018). The concept of “participatory democracy” that I use in this Article also draws
upon democratic models developed under different names. See generally BARBER, supra note 20 (“strong
democracy”); FRANK M. BRYAN, REAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING AND
HOW IT WORKS (2004) (“real democracy”); SUSAN CLARK & WODEN TEACHOUT, SLOW
DEMOCRACY: REDISCOVERING COMMUNITY, BRINGING DECISION MAKING BACK HOME (2012)
(“slow democracy”); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980) (“unitary
democracy”).
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The Trouble in Rural America

Rural America is struggling. Poverty rates, already high, are growing.27
Jobs, already scarce, are disappearing.28 Statistics at the individual level bear
this out, including alarming figures about the health and mortality of rural
residents.29 Equally disturbing is the effect of these challenges on the rural
communities in which they live. Many of these communities are buckling under
the weight of supporting those who have fallen into poverty and despair. For
others, the prospect of becoming a “ghost town” is now a startling reality.30
Amid all of this, many rural residents feel that the “moral order” of their
community is breaking down.31
But the plight of rural America is more than a story of deprivation,
dislocation, and decline. It is also reflected in the widespread political
disaffection among rural residents. In study after study, a troubling picture of
rural consciousness is emerging, characterized by a loss of hope, a sense of
powerlessness, the feeling that no one is listening, and the gnawing fear that
nothing can be done.32 Rural residents attribute these sentiments to a number
of external factors: globalization, bureaucracy, and antirural bias, to name a
27. See, e.g., James J. Sandman & Ronald S. Flagg, Foreword, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1
(2018); see also RURAL POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, at xiii (Ann R. Tickamyer, Jennifer
Sherman & Jennifer Warlick eds., 2017).
28. See, e.g., CLARA HENDRICKSON, MARK MURO & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, BROOKINGS,
COUNTERING THE GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT: STRATEGIES FOR LEFT-BEHIND PLACES 9–10
(2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Report_Counteringgeography-of-discontent_Hendrickson-Muro-Galston.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4EN-T5VW].
29. Anne Case and Angus Deaton were the first to note the increasing mortality rate among loweducated white non-Hispanic males. See Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in
Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PNAS 15078, 15078 (2015).
Disaggregating the data for different geographic units, Stephen Snyder suggested that the rising
mortality rate was greatest in rural areas. See Stephen Edward Snyder, Urban and Rural Divergence in
Mortality Trends: A Comment on Case and Deaton, 113 PNAS E815, E815 (2016). For a more in-depth
analysis of the challenges that rural communities face with respect to healthcare, see Nicole Huberfeld,
Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 242 (2018).
30. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1376 (2012).
31. See J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS 5
(2016); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA 6–7
(2018) [hereinafter WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND].
32. See generally KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER 12 (2016) (coining the term
“rural consciousness” to refer to the collective lens through which people living in rural communities
interpret politics and describing how rural consciousness is “infused with . . . a sense that rural folks
don’t get their fair share”); JUSTIN GEST, THE NEW MINORITY: WHITE WORKING CLASS POLITICS
IN AN AGE OF IMMIGRATION AND INEQUALITY (2016) (explaining how these sentiments drive the
white middle class away from centrist politics and towards radical, populist fringes in both the United
States and Britain); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS: OVERCOMING CLASS
CLUELESSNESS IN AMERICA (2017) (discussing the destabilizing effects of alienating rural Americans
from political discourse); ROBERT WUTHNOW, SMALL-TOWN AMERICA: FINDING COMMUNITY,
SHAPING THE FUTURE (2013) (unpacking common assumptions about living in small towns through
in-depth interviews and comparative modeling).
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few.33 Taken together, however, they reflect the frustration of a group that has
traditionally valued individual self-reliance and community self-determination
but increasingly finds itself lacking both agency and control.34
Rural decline and rural disaffection are, of course, interconnected, not just
because deprivation breeds discontent but also because both are tied to a
dramatic transformation now reshaping rural America. Stereotypes of rural life
as “static, homogenous, and traditional” may still be common.35 Yet, as Lisa
Pruitt has argued, “evidence abounds that rural America is in the midst of
significant change—demographically, economically, and culturally.”36 The
growth of rural manufacturing in the twentieth century replaced many of the
agricultural jobs lost to automation and industry consolidation.37 But this shift
also made the rural economy more vulnerable to deindustrialization, global
competition, and the cost-cutting calculus of corporate management.38 Rural
communities have long struggled with depopulation.39 But in many
communities, this demographic challenge is also compounded by growing racial
and socioeconomic diversity as increasing numbers of immigrants and urban
residents relocate to rural areas for work, recreation, or a new start.40 Even the
social and cultural foundations of rural America seem to be in flux: traditional

33. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 32, at 6, 67; VANCE, supra note 31, at 7.
34. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 110–13.
35. Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GE N D E R L. & JUST. 338,
348–49 (2008).
36. Id.
37. See GENE F. SUMMERS ET AL., INDUSTRIAL INVASION OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA:
A QUARTER CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 11–12 (1976); David A. McGranahan, How People Make a
Living in Rural America, in CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
135, 135–37, 143 (David L. Brown & Louis E. Swanson eds., 2003); Dennis Roth, Thinking About Rural
Manufacturing: A Brief History, RURAL AM., Jan. 2000, at 12, 15–16.
38. See Peter Cole, A Tale of Two Towns: Globalization and Rural Deindustrialization in the U.S., 12
WORKINGUSA 539, 539–41 (2009).
39. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION
BULLETIN 200, RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2018 EDITION 2 (2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/90556/eib-200.pdf?v=5899.2 [https://perma.cc/2FUP-6GAD]. It should be
noted, however, that population trends vary significantly across rural communities. See id.; see also
WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 6–8.
40. See generally Daniel T. Lichter, Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural America, 77
RURAL SOC. 3 (2012) (examining new patterns of Hispanic migration to rural areas and resulting
tensions); Peter B. Nelson, Alexander Oberg & Lise Nelson, Rural Gentrification and Linked Migration
in the United States, 26 J. RURAL STUD. 343 (2010) (tracing class, ethnic, and racial trends contributing
to rural gentrification in certain counties); Gregory Sharp & Barrett A. Lee, New Faces in Rural Places:
Patterns and Sources of Nonmetropolitan Ethnoracial Diversity Since 1990, 82 RURAL SOC. 411 (2017)
(showing that increases in racialethnic diversity are most likely to occur in nonmetropolitan
communities with abundant economic opportunities, among other characteristics); Jennifer Sherman,
“Not Allowed To Inherit My Kingdom”: Amenity Development and Social Inequality in the Rural West, 83
RURAL SOC. 174 (2018) (describing shifting social values in part due to demographic changes).
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family structures are eroding,41 church attendance and membership in civic
organizations are shrinking,42 and rates of drug addiction and alcoholism are
growing.43
These changes explain why efforts to address rural decline are so difficult.
For many communities, the prospect of restoring what’s lost is remote. To
survive and ultimately thrive, these communities need to reinvent and
reimagine themselves for the twenty-first century. What will be the new rural
economy, and how should it be structured? What will be the new rural
community, and who will be included? What will be the new rural identity, and
which norms and values will be associated with it? These are political questions
involving delicate trade-offs. Resolving them will require serious conversations
about the relationship of rural residents with corporations, newcomers, and
themselves. It is unlikely that any effort can be successful without some degree
of buy-in from existing residents. And for such buy-in to be achieved, there will
likely need to be a high degree of civic engagement and public participation
among the residents themselves.
Yet these changes are also why rural disaffection is so concerning. If civic
engagement and public participation are necessary to address the
transformation facing many rural communities, they also appear to be precisely
what is missing in rural politics today. Many rural residents have lost faith in
politics altogether, convinced that neither government nor democracy can bring
about meaningful change.44 Others are mired in a “politics of resentment,”
fueling a populist movement focused more on what (and who) they stand against
rather than what they stand for.45 On the one hand are the external forces
perceived to be responsible for their struggles: globalization, immigration, and
cosmopolitanism.46 On the other are the institutions that rural residents believe
have repeatedly let them down: the government and, more specifically, the

41. See, e.g., Diane K. McLaughlin & Alisha J. Coleman-Jensen, Economic Restructuring and Family
Structure Change, 1980 to 2000, in ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND FAMILY WELL-BEING IN
RURAL AMERICA 105, 105–07 (Kristin E. Smith & Ann R. Tickamyer eds., 2011).
42. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, LOOSE CONNECTIONS: JOINING TOGETHER IN AMERICA’S
FRAGMENTED COMMUNITIES 135–38 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach & Dan Keating, A New Divide in American Death, WASH. POST (Apr.
10, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/04/10/a-new-divide-in-american-death/
[https://perma.cc/RDQ2-ZHJR (dark archive)].
44. See, e.g., JENNIFER M. SILVA, WE’RE STILL HERE: PAIN AND POLITICS IN THE HEART OF
AMERICA 161 (2019).
45. See CRAMER, supra note 32, at 220–23; ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN
THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 102, 136–39 (2016).
46. See JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL
POLITICAL DIVIDE 254 (2019); see also CHRISTOPHER D. JOHNSTON, HOWARD G. LAVINE &
CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO, OPEN VERSUS CLOSED: PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND THE
POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION 242–44 (2017).
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political “establishment.”47 Perhaps nothing better captures all these strands in
rural politics than its growing animus against cities.48 To be sure, the urbanrural divide has long been a feature of American politics.49 But as many now see
it, our divided politics today are increasingly along rural and urban lines.50
There is, of course, a certain irony to the rural backlash against cities. After
all, the “rural crisis” that many communities are facing today bears a striking
similarity to the “urban crisis” that confronted America’s big cities in the
twentieth century. A generation earlier, it was city leaders who negotiated the
fraught economic relationship between management and labor and struggled to
reinvent their communities when deindustrialization restructured the urban
economy.51 It was inner-city neighborhoods that suffered most from the
devastating effects of depopulation and wrestled with the racial and class
divisions left in its wake.52 It was the conditions of “urban living”—the crowded
living arrangements, the weakness of social ties, the coming together of
strangers—that many believed lay at the roots of moral decline, the rise of outof-wedlock births, and the drug epidemic.53 Given these similarities, one might
suppose that rural communities might look to cities, if only to learn from their
experience. But the divide between rural and urban America is only widening,
and the possibility of finding common ground seems increasingly remote.
47. See Frank Rich, No Sympathy for the Hillbilly, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 20, 2017), http://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2017/03/frank-rich-no-sympathy-for-the-hillbilly.html [https://perma.cc/U76A-GN63].
48. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 32, at 5–6; WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at
98–101.
49. See, e.g., STEVEN CONN, AMERICANS AGAINST THE CITY: ANTI-URBANISM IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 17–18 (2014) (describing the urban-rural divide during the populist uprising
at the turn of the twentieth century); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW
OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 220–23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
50. See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 46, at 253.
51. See, e.g., Andrew E. G. Jonas, Labor and Community in the Deindustrialization of Urban America,
17 J. URB. AFF. 183, 184–86 (1995). Indeed, the connection between urban and rural deindustrialization
is arguably even more direct. Many of the industries that left the inner cities in the twentieth century—
meat packing, furniture manufacturing, textiles—initially relocated to rural areas and were the reason
for the industrialization of the rural economy. See, e.g., GARY ARMES MATTSON, AMERICAN
HOMETOWN RENEWAL: POLICY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR SMALL TOWN OFFICIALS 9–10
(2017).
52. See, e.g., KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 234–35 (2005); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 5–6 (1996). Even today, large metropolitan regions and
small rural communities share one demographic trend: both are disproportionately dependent on
international migration for population growth. Jed Kolko, How Much Slower Would the U.S. Grow
Without Immigration? In Many Places, a Lot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/18/upshot/how-much-slower-would-the-us-grow-without-immigration-in-many-places-alot.html [https://perma.cc/H6YT-2B6C (dark archive)].
53. See, e.g., PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 4–6 (1997); STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND
THE MORAL PANIC OVER THE CITY 1–2 (2006); BRIAN TOCHTERMAN, THE DYING CITY:
POSTWAR NEW YORK AND THE IDEOLOGY OF FEAR 14 (2017).
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In short, rural America is at a crossroads. The need for short-term relief—
in the form of assistance, investment, and attention—is real. Yet, such relief is
no substitute for the political negotiations that will be required for many rural
communities to arrive at a long-term strategy for where they need or want to
go. This crossroads is not altogether unfamiliar in American history; it has long
been the backdrop against which urban policies are made.54 What is new is that
rural communities now face the difficult task of navigating this transformation.
B.

The Crisis of Rural Democracy

Rural decline and rural disaffection are not only interconnected but also
mutually reinforcing. Taken together, I suggest here, the crisis in rural America
is also a crisis of rural democracy. Rural residents feel disempowered, devalued,
and increasingly divorced from the policy decisions that affect their everyday
lives. Having experienced little of the agency and control that democratic
participation promises, many have lost faith in democracy altogether. These
feelings are certainly exacerbated by the economic forces that are reshaping the
lives of rural residents. Equally important is the governmental structure that
determines how rural residents participate in the affairs of their community. In
other words, rural decline and disaffection reflect not only the effects of rural
restructuring; they also reflect the democratic deficit in rural communities.
To be sure, democracy is not the usual lens through which the plight of
rural America is framed. Rather, the prevailing view is that democracy is one of
the few areas where rural residents are thought to have an advantage. Those
who study “participatory democracy” often commend rural communities for
their democratic capacity. It is in these places—where thick social ties proliferate
and face-to-face interactions are still possible—that many believe the social
conditions still exist for robust political participation.55 Similarly, for those
concerned about “representative democracy” and how political influence is
exercised at the polls, the most common complaint is that rural residents have
too much political power, not too little.56 Indeed, recent calls to abolish the
electoral college, restructure the composition of the Senate, or ban partisan

54. See Edward L. Glaeser, Reinventing Boston: 1630–2003, 5 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 119, 125–26
(2005); see also EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION
MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 8–9 (2011) (arguing that the
cities that survived deindustrialization were those able to reinvent themselves).
55. See, e.g., DAVID L. BROWN & KAI A. SCHAFFT, RURAL PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES IN THE
21ST CENTURY: RESILIENCE AND TRANSFORMATION 56 (2011); see also GRODZINS, supra note 49,
at 206; Mildred E. Warner et al., Organizing Communities To Sustain Rural Landscapes: Lessons from
New York, 30 COMMUNITY DEV. J. 178, 181–83 (1999). On the importance of face-to-face
interactions, see BERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 10–11.
56. See RODDEN, supra note 46, at 254.

98 N.C. L. REV. 837 (2020)

848

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

gerrymandering are largely based on the belief that rural residents are given far
more political influence than their numbers justify.57
But if political disaffection remains far more prevalent in rural America
than elsewhere, it may be because true participatory democracy requires more
than the social conditions thought necessary for participatory politics. The
existence of governmental outlets as forums for political discourse and for
translating community sentiments into collective action is also important.58
Political commentators have long recognized the “pervasiveness of politics in
rural life.”59 Social observers have also long noted the mutual trust and shared
commitments that bind rural communities together.60 These and other features
of “civil society” have led many researchers to uphold small towns as fertile
ground for participatory democracy.61 Yet what is often overlooked is that the
civic capacity in rural America does not directly translate into democratic
capacity in rural governance.62 In other words, democratic scholars today too
often assume that “governments are manifestations of the civic process.”63 But
“[t]he idea that a government could itself be an important, even primary
component of civil society has been pretty much abandoned.”64
Moreover, if democracy is understood not simply as a mechanism for
aggregating individual preferences through the casting of votes but instead as a
means for ordinary citizens to take an active role in policymaking and agenda
setting, then the scale at which democratic participation takes place is also
important.65 Channeled through the machinery of partisan politics, rural
residents have been given a powerful avenue for expressing their frustration
57. See Emily Badger, How the Rural-Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault Line, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/upshot/america-political-divide-urbanrural.html [https://perma.cc/6LU2-VGMD (dark archive)].
58. Indeed, one of the characteristics of rural disaffection that Jennifer Silva noted in her
interviews is “a focus on self-efficacy over collective efficacy, and a dismissal of larger social concerns
that do not seem to affect them personally and immediately,” which she fears “prove[s] a shaky
foundation for collective action.” SILVA, supra note 44, at 158–59.
59. ARTHUR J. VIDICH & JOSEPH BENSMAN, SMALL TOWN IN MASS SOCIETY: CLASS,
POWER AND RELIGION IN A RURAL COMMUNITY 109 (1960).
60. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 13–43.
61. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 119, 205–06 (2000).
62. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 209 (“Unremitting civic participation is more
characteristic of totalitarianism than of democracy, and the greater participation of rural than urban
citizens in the affairs of both local and federal governments cannot be equated with the citizen control
of those governments.”).
63. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 14; see also Sarah Dewees, Linda Lobao & Louis E. Swanson, Local
Economic Development in an Age of Devolution: The Question of Rural Localities, 68 RURAL SOC. 182, 188,
203 (2003).
64. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 14.
65. Id. at 69–81; CLARK & TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 181. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL &
EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973) (considering the impact of population and
geographic size on democratic processes and outcomes).
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with the political establishment in Washington and state capitals.
Representation at higher levels, however, has not translated into a feeling of
empowerment at the local level. For many rural residents, state and national
politics are simply too remote and inaccessible to be a meaningful forum for
democratic participation.66 Their perception is that policymaking at those levels
is dominated by moneyed “special interests” whose influence outstrips that
which can be exercised by ordinary residents. And while partisan gerrymandering
has increased the influence of rural voters, it has often done so by creating
legislative districts that increasingly combine rural and suburban areas in ways
that dilute the salience of rural issues, especially those tied to specific
communities.67 Ironically, then, partisan gerrymandering may be increasing the
voting power of rural Americans while at the same time undermining the
representation of rural interests.
All of this is to say that in assessing rural democracy, we must pay
attention to governmental institutions at the local level. This means focusing on
the role of local governments in assessing the state of rural democracy. After all,
Alexis de Tocqueville once celebrated rural local governments as the foundation
of American democracy because he saw them as venues for democratic
participation and vehicles for community self-determination. It was the sense of
agency that they afforded to their residents, and not their role as administrative
subdivisions, that Tocqueville believed central to the American experiment.68
Tocqueville recognized that local democracy did not necessarily ensure wise
decisions or efficient administration.69 But the vibrancy, energy, and collective
spirit that he witnessed in his travels through America convinced him that the
virtue of democracy lay in the agency and control that Americans exercised over
their own lives.70 Laws are treated with more respect and viewed as legitimate
because of the role that individuals can play in their design and implementation
at the local level.71 Collective action is more likely, and public participation more
robust, because of the natural affections and attachments that people feel
towards their communities.72 Everywhere, Tocqueville described the buzz of
activity that Americans were engaged in to advance the interests of themselves
and of their neighbors.73 It was this public spirit that he celebrated most in his
66. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 32, at 60–65.
67. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, The Real Fix for Gerrymandering Is Proportional Representation, VOX
(Nov. 6, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/
gerrymandering-proportional-representation [https://perma.cc/YM53-QR9N] (describing an
“arbitrary” district that combines “some of the suburbs of San Antonio and some of the suburbs of
Austin plus a big disconnected patch of rural Texas”).
68. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 10, at 82.
69. See id. at 85–86.
70. See id. at 87–89.
71. See id. at 88–89.
72. See id. at 62–63.
73. See id.
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account of American democracy, and rural towns and villages were the
institutions that he believed most responsible. As Tocqueville explained: “It is
not the administrative, but the political effects of the local system that I most
admire in America.”74
But if this was the rural vision that underlay Tocqueville’s description of
American democracy, its erosion is what pervades modern accounts of rural life.
Economic dislocation and social dysfunction may be at the root of what we now
refer to as the rural crisis. Just as troubling is how all of this has shaken the
confidence and outlook of rural residents. Even when rural issues are being
addressed, rural residents repeatedly complain that their voices are not being
heard—on agricultural practices, rural land use, even the opioid epidemic.75 To
get anything done, they believe that they must “look up”—to draw the attention
of a state representative or federal official who is willing to both listen and
champion their cause.76 Increasingly in short supply is the simple idea that rural
residents might be able to take governmental action collectively, locally, and
without the need for state or federal intervention. As a result, despite the
proliferation of political discussions in diners and around kitchen tables all
across rural America, participants understand these to be largely talk without
outlets for action. Similarly, when candidates and officials descend upon rural
communities for “town hall” events, attendees neither experience nor expect
the kind of participatory policymaking typical of the New England town hall
meetings that share the name.77 From this perspective, the solution to the rural
crisis is going to require more than policy choices designed to help rural
residents. It will have to address the fact that local governments today offer rural
residents so few opportunities to help themselves.
During the depth of the urban crisis, we learned that it was not enough to
provide relief to cities; city residents also had to be given a greater voice in
determining their fate.78 Ironically, many of the democratic movements during
that time looked to rural communities for inspiration. They sought ways to
replicate the social ties and community engagement that were assumed to
proliferate in small towns across America and proposed further decentralization
of urban governance—little city halls, neighborhood associations—to achieve
74. Id. at 88.
75. See, e.g., WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 102–05; Patricia Strach, Katie
Zuber & Elizabeth Pérez-Chiqués, Listen, ROCKEFELLER INST. GOV’T (June 6, 2018),
https://rockinst.org/blog/stories-from-sullivan-listen/ [https://perma.cc/XUC7-K8WB].
76. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 9, 90–91.
77. See BRYAN, supra note 26, at 52–53. Indeed, when mentioning “town hall meetings” to my
colleagues, I’ve been struck by how often their first and sometimes only impression is the televisedcampaign-event version.
78. See, e.g., JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 180–81 (1983); James Q. Wilson,
Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 242, 244–45
(1963).
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those aims.79 What was left unquestioned was whether the rural models that
advocates drew upon actually worked in the rural communities that they
idealized. Urban problems have become rural problems. The question that
remains is whether democracy in rural America will receive the same attention
that has been paid to democracy in the urban context.
C.

The Neglect of Rural Local Governments

Addressing the challenges facing rural America is no easy task. National
and state policies will likely be part of the equation, and efforts by individuals,
businesses, and civic organizations will also be important. But it is hard to
imagine an effective response without the involvement of rural communities
themselves. Meaningful state and federal policies require input from rural
residents and lobbying by local leaders. The capacity of civic and religious
organizations is tied to the ability of rural communities to build connections
and bridge differences. And when assistance from government and private
sources are not forthcoming, rural residents need a way to be able to tackle these
problems on their own. In our federal system, local governments have
historically served that role—not only in the services they provide but also as a
forum for political negotiation. We have also long celebrated the ability of local
governments to develop tailored policies and experiment with novel
approaches.80
Why is it then that rural local governments are largely invisible in
discussions about the plight of rural America? Among those advocating for a
more robust response to the struggles of rural communities, the role of local
governments is widely ignored. Among those who study local governments,
attention to rural communities is largely absent. All of this contrasts sharply
with the national response to the urban crisis in the twentieth century. Even
during the depth of urban decline, cities were widely acknowledged as playing
an important role in the response.81 Even as urban policies were developed at
the state and federal level, no one believed that they would be effective without
the buy-in and participation of city leaders and local residents.82 Indeed, even
those who blamed the urban crisis on the cities themselves viewed reforms to
city governance as a vital part of the solution.83 But as rural decline drags on,
one strains to hear any mention of rural local governments. Not by national or
79. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 292–94; ERIC A. NORDLINGER, DECENTRALIZING THE
CITY: A STUDY OF BOSTON’S LITTLE CITY HALLS 30–41 (1972).
80. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and
Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1221–22 (2014); Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 191, 198 (2016) [hereinafter Su, Intrastate Federalism].
81. See Wilson, supra note 78, at 243.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC
DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 129–41 (1991).
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state leaders. Not by the media or general public. Indeed, not even by the rural
residents themselves.
Some of this, I suspect, is because of the move away from the study of
local governments generally that took place throughout the twentieth century.84
Or perhaps it simply reveals the urban bias of academics and political leaders
who, as Frank Bryan argues, tend to come from cities and suburbs rather than
the countryside.85 But maybe the invisibility of rural local governments is no
mere oversight. Rather, their limited place in public consciousness may be a
result of the limited role that they currently play in political life, even among
the rural residents that they serve. And that limited role, I argue, is due in part
to how rural local governments are structured and organized in American law.
In other words, if rural communities have thus far struggled to respond to
the challenges they face, the reason may also lie in the legal and political
standing of the kinds of local governments that govern in rural areas. Despite
their democratic structure, rural local governments tend to be imperfect
representatives of the communities that they purport to serve. Although
politically organized as general-purpose governments, their legal status is
primarily as administrative apparatuses of the state. Indeed, even among local
governments in general, those that govern rural areas tend to possess even less
power to enact tailored or innovative policies on their own. In short, rural
communities are not just suffering; they also lack the democratic capacity to
mount a meaningful response.
Below, I trace the legal and political developments that have contributed
to these facets of rural local governments. The point I wish to make here is
simply how much the legal standing of rural local governments goes unexamined
and unquestioned. For some, the belief that rural communities are where
American democracy flourishes obscures the realities of how rural governance
is structured and organized as a matter of law.86 For others, the conviction that
rural local governments are nothing more than administrative subdivisions is so
entrenched that it is hard to imagine an alternative, or why such an alternative
may be necessary.87 It may be, as many have claimed, that this passivity simply
reflects the inherent nature of rural residents and their distrust of government
in general. But perhaps the chain of causation is reversed: the disaffected rural
84. Local government studies peaked at the turn of the twentieth century, as reflected in the
works of Frank Goodnow, Woodrow Wilson, and others in the burgeoning field of public
administration. See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 43–48 (1914)
(discussing the legal development of local government within the United States); Woodrow Wilson,
The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 221 (1887) (“This interlacing of local self-government
with federal self-government is quite a modern conception.”).
85. See BRYAN, supra note 26, at 14.
86. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
87. See Clarence J. Hein, Rural Local Government in Sparsely Populated Areas, 42 J. FARM ECON.
827, 836–37 (1960).
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voter may be a product of the legal structure through which their most
immediate governmental institution is defined.
II. THE LAW OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
To understand the decline and disaffection in rural America then, we have
to consider the democratic capacity of rural local governments. We must
examine not only their political organization but also how they are legally
defined. This part delves into the historical record to reveal the roots of local
governance in rural areas. It argues that the democratic deficit in rural America
today can be traced back to the manner in which rural local governments like
counties and towns were constructed and the purpose for which they were
created. Although rural residents have been able to exercise meaningful control
in the past, these early developments in the organization and construction of
rural local governments also set the stage for the erosion of their democratic
capacity later on. In other words, the current state of rural democracy is the
result of legal and political choices made in the initial organization of rural local
governments in American law and the lingering influence of those choices on
their development.
A.

The Political Organization of Rural Local Governments

Understanding rural democracy means understanding the type of local
government that tends to govern rural areas. Cities may dominate the
discussion of local power in the academic literature, but in rural America, cities
are rare. Instead, counties and towns tend to be the predominant forms of rural
governance. Their relative importance, of course, varies from state to state. In
New England, for example, towns tend to govern with little involvement by
counties.88 The reverse is true in the South and Southwest, where towns
generally do not exist as separate legal entities, and counties serve as the lowest
level of government in rural areas.89 A hybrid system can be found in the MidAtlantic and the Midwest, where counties are subdivided into towns.90 The
structure of rural local governments in America then can generally be described
as constituting three diagonal bands, each tracking the system that early settlers
brought with them from Europe and their migration westward.91
It is easy to assume from this diversity that little could be said about the
democratic structure of rural America as a whole. But similarities exist, and they

88. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 220–23, 230–32 (London, MacMillan
& Co. 1888).
89. See id. at 220, 223–25, 232–34; TOWN AND COUNTY: ESSAYS ON THE STRUCTURE OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 3–4 (Bruce C. Daniels ed., 1978).
90. See BRYCE, supra note 88, at 220–21, 225, 234–35.
91. See id. at 220–21.
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reveal how little democratic representation factors into the institutional design
of rural local governments.
First, counties and towns are largely artificial constructs.92 Indeed, their
creation reverses the ordinary presumption that local governments represent an
existing social community. The incorporation of a city or a village traditionally
begins with a community of residents that petition for legal recognition.93 As a
result, their boundaries tend to reflect the initial footprint of that community
and subsequent annexations tracking its growth.94 Rural counties and towns,
however, are often designated on a map long before settlement patterns have
emerged. Once drawn, their boundaries almost never change.95 This is why
counties and towns tend to be relatively uniform in both size and shape. The
typical Midwest township, for example, “is a square with straight line
boundaries, containing an area of thirty-six square miles”(mirroring the six-bysix mile “survey townships” drawn by the federal government upon which they
are based).96 Similarly, as one early commentator remarked, “[o]ver five-sixths
of the Union each county presents a square figure on the map, with nothing
distinctive about it, nothing ‘natural’ about it.”97 Even the boundaries of many
92. See id. at 249–50, 254; see also CLYDE F. SNIDER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RURAL
AMERICA 20 (1957) (“The geographical townships marked out by the rectangular land surveys of the
national government commonly provided the areas for new civil townships (except in eastern Ohio);
and the artificial nature of these areas has been an important factor in preventing the township in these
regions from attaining the social unity and political importance of the New England town.”).
93. See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE
VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 7, 123–24 (1994). Although villages are often used interchangeably
with towns and townships in common speech to refer to small communities, the village form of
government in nearly all states is a municipal government similar to that of cities. Unlike counties and
unincorporated towns and townships, they are created voluntarily through the will of their inhabitants.
See, e.g., WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, STATE OF WIS., THE WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK
136 (1952) (“Cities and villages constitute the only general local units of government in Wisconsin
which came into existence solely because of the wishes of the inhabitants thereof . . . . [T]he boundaries
of counties and towns are largely arbitrary and do not necessarily indicate a community of interests
among those living therein . . . .”). It should be noted that in some states, especially those without
unincorporated towns and townships, an incorporated community can opt to refer to itself as a city,
town, or village. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-1(2) (2019) (“‘City’ means a municipal corporation
organized under the laws of this State . . . . The term ‘city’ does not include counties or municipal
corporations organized for a special purpose. ‘City’ is interchangeable with the terms ‘town’ and
‘village’ . . . .”); see also id. § 160A-101(2) (“The city may be styled a city, town, or village.”).
94. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 155 (1985).
95. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1140–41 (2008).
96. JOHN A. FAIRLIE & CHARLES MAYNARD KNEIER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION 451 (1930). For a description of the origins and legacy of the “survey townships,”
see generally Vernon Carstensen, Patterns on the American Land, 18 PUBLIUS 31 (1988).
97. BRYCE, supra note 88, at 254; see also HARLAN PAUL DOUGLASS, THE LITTLE TOWN:
ESPECIALLY IN ITS RURAL RELATIONSHIPS 50–51 (1919) (“Even the counties generally became
rectangular areas, showing nothing informing as to social structure within, nor as to the larger social
relationships.”).
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New England towns, which are often described as true communities, were
initially drawn by colonial governors, as was the case for the 251 towns in
Vermont.98
The consequence of this artificial form is that rural local governments tend
to be imperfect representations of the communities that they serve. Rural
residents may have deep attachments to their community, but that community
can sometimes bear little relationship to the local government that governs
them.99 This is certainly the case for counties, whose size means that they often
encompass a large number of self-identified communities that do not necessarily
see themselves as a cohesive whole. Writing in the late nineteenth century, James
Bryce observed that “the county, even in the South, has continued to be an
artificial entity, and has drawn to itself no great part of the interest and affections
of the citizens.”100 In theory, towns should better approximate the social ties of
rural residents, especially given their smaller size. But again, not only are towns
entirely absent as a legal and political institution in much of rural America, the
manner in which they are created in the parts of the country where they exist
also means that they are often an imperfect fit.101 As John Fairlie explained, the
“economic and social centers” of rural life often emerge only after township
boundaries have already been established.102 Consequently, the social
boundaries of rural communities may encompass residents of many towns, while
simultaneously dividing the residents of any given town.103 Indeed, this is often
the case when the centers of rural communities emerge on the boundaries or
corners of an existing town’s jurisdiction.
What all of this suggests is that despite the importance of community to
rural residents, counties and towns do not correspond all that well to their lived
experiences on the ground. This brings us to my second point about the political
organization of rural local governments: democratic representation was not the
purpose for which they were created. The towns of New England and their
town hall meetings are still celebrated today as models of participatory
democracy. But as Michael Zuckerman points out, New England towns were
initially founded on principles of religious harmony, and their town hall

98. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 110.
99. My discussion of towns here focuses on unincorporated towns and townships. In contrast,
incorporated towns and villages in the states that allow for them often better track the natural
community that petitioned for their creation. But similar to metropolitan fragmentation between city
and suburb that has long drawn the attention of urban scholars, town and village incorporations often
divide rural communities between “town” and “country.” See DOUGLASS, supra note 97, at 14.
100. BRYCE, supra note 88, at 254.
101. See, e.g., LANE W. LANCASTER, GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA 62 (2d ed. 1952)
(noting that town boundaries often “did not correspond either to the social groupings of the people or
to the methods of land cultivation [and thus] seldom embodied a real community”).
102. FAIRLIE & KNEIER, supra note 96, at 461.
103. Id.
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meetings achieved consensus by actively suppressing dissent and excluding
from the community those who did not fit in.104 More importantly, the New
England model never spread outside of the Northeast. Instead, counties and
towns in the rest of America were explicitly created as administrative
subdivisions of the state—convenient tools for states to exercise control over
their vast territorial jurisdictions.105
The administrative orientation of rural local governments is most evident
in the kinds of local officials that were historically designated to serve. Early in
the development of cities, mayors and city councils emerged as the central
governing officials.106 As legislative bodies, city councils passed ordinances and
bylaws. Urban administration—police, sanitation, roads—fell under the
mayor’s authority.107 In rural America, however, the earliest local officials
consisted largely of sheriffs, constables, judges, and justices of the peace.108
Though their governmental roles were broader than those labels might now
suggest, their responsibilities were still largely the administration and
enforcement of state laws—criminal justice, tax collection, and state
elections.109 Many were appointed directly by the governor.110 They were not
considered a representative of the people that they governed, and certainly not
in a legislative capacity.111 Indeed, even today, town and county officials tend to
be defined primarily by their administrative function: clerk, supervisor of
elections, assessor, highway superintendent. And in many states, they continue
to be legally construed as state officials who happen to be assigned to a particular
local jurisdiction.112
Even when elections for county and town officials became common,113 the
ability of ordinary residents to influence their activities were constrained in
practice. In the early decades of the republic, when voting rights were restricted
104. See MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 69–70, 111–13, 126–40 (1978).
105. See LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 49 (“The county, in the contemplation of the law, is a more
or less convenient area laid out under state authority for the local performance of functions regarded
as largely or primarily of state concern.”); see also DOUGLASS, supra note 97, at 187–88.
106. See 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
235–37 (3d rev. ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881); HEADS OF THE LOCAL STATE: MAYORS,
PROVOSTS AND BURGOMASTERS SINCE 1800, at 192–93 (John Garrard ed., 2007).
107. See DILLON, supra note 106, at 38–39 & n.1.
108. See, e.g., EDWARD CHANNING, TOWN AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN THE ENGLISH
COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 44–52 (Herbert B. Adams ed., Baltimore, Murray 1884).
109. See id. at 45–46.
110. JOHN A. FAIRLIE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN COUNTIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES 33–35
(1906); see also John A. Fairlie, Judicial and Administrative Control of County Officers, 28 MICH. L. REV.
250, 273 (1930).
111. See, e.g., BRYCE, supra note 88, at 224–25, 253–54.
112. See infra Section III.A.
113. See FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 46 (describing the move towards elections for county and town
officials in the 1850s).
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to white male landowners, county governance in the South was controlled by
plantation owners and local elites.114 Even after the elective franchise was
expanded in the mid-nineteenth century, the influence of rural residents on
county governments continued to be constrained. In metropolitan counties
anchored by a central city, the electorate that selected county officials was often
disproportionately influenced by urban and suburban voters despite the fact
that county functions tended to focus on rural areas where city services were
not provided.115 In counties that were entirely or largely rural, county
government often fell under the influence of the so-called “courthouse gang”:
“a more or less permanent group of elective and appointive officeholders
together with private individuals whose business normally brings them into
contact with public officials.”116 Though the activities of the “courthouse gangs”
mirror in some ways the political machines that dominated city governments at
the same time, voter suppression rather than mobilization tended to be the
primary means by which rural elites maintained control.117
Another area where the administrative origins of rural local governments
left its mark is in the functional fragmentation that still typifies their structure.
Earlier, I pointed out the large number of single-purpose offices that constitute
the organization of county and town governments. What makes these offices so
different from their city counterparts is that they are generally structured as
independent silos with few formal linkages between them.118 Thus, in most
states, the county sheriff operates independently of the county clerk, who
performs her functions separately from the county assessor, the county
114. Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70 VAND. L. REV. 413, 429 (2017); see also
BRYCE, supra note 88, at 223–24.
115. See, e.g., Vincent L. Marando & Mavis Mann Reeves, Counties as Local Governments: Research
Issues and Questions, 13 J. URB. AFF. 45, 50–51 (1991). Some states do recognize this divergence of
county responsibilities, at least with respect to certain matters. For example, in New York, county
charters can only be amended if it is approved by residents living outside of incorporated cities
irrespective of the vote of the county as a whole. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action
at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 261–62 (1977).
116. LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 57. For a contemporary critique of rural local officials, see
generally Lexye L. Shockley, Regulating Boss Hogg—Citizen Empowerment and Rural Government
Accountability, 4 SAVANNAH L. REV. 225 (2017).
117. See VIDICH & BENSMAN, supra note 59, at 122–23, 279–80. For a contemporary account of
business elite’s control of local politics, see CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN, WORLDS APART: POVERTY AND
POLITICS IN RURAL AMERICA 14–18 (2d ed. 2014).
118. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 97, at 193; FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 68–69. The
organization of county and, to a lesser extent, town governments bears similarities to the “commission”
form of city government, which experienced a sharp rise and fall in popularity during the Progressive
Era at the turn of the twentieth century. Under the commission model, city government consisted of a
number of independent commissioners, each in charge of a different municipal department. See AMY
BRIDGES, MORNING GLORIES: MUNICIPAL REFORM IN THE SOUTHWEST 58–59 (1997); see also
SAM BASS WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF ITS GROWTH
10 (1968) (describing a commission form of government for the town of Philadelphia in the eighteenth
century).
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treasurer, and the county highway supervisor. This organization initially made
sense because, as a legal matter, county and town officials are largely understood
to be local agents of the state—each charged with performing a discrete task
within the state’s administrative organization. After all, if city offices are
traditionally defined by municipal charters, those of counties and towns are
often designated by state constitutions.119 But even when county and town
boards emerged in the nineteenth century with legislative and executive powers
over their jurisdiction, these boards continued to be denied much, if any,
authority over those local offices.120 This is not to say that informal coordination
did not exist between locally elected officials. Moreover, by the end of the
nineteenth century, all of these offices would be chosen through local
elections.121 Yet, unlike the predominant forms of cities, the political structure
in rural areas fragmented responsibilities in ways that made it harder to assign
accountability, mobilize for reform, and coordinate local policies.
Nor did the rise of county and town boards necessarily expand the
legislative capabilities of rural communities outside of their administrative
obligations.122 County and town boards were frequently given the power to
manage “local affairs.”123 But what constituted such affairs was narrowly
defined by state law. With cities and villages, their structure and
responsibilities are usually set forth in municipal charters, which reflect, at
least in part, the desires and interests of their residents.124 The “affairs” of
counties and towns, however, are generally found in state statutes125 and thus
tend to be limited to the enforcement and implementation of state policies.
119. See DILLON, supra note 106, at 16.
120. See, e.g., VIDICH & BENSMAN, supra note 59, at 142 (“The actual legal jurisdiction of the
board is much broader than the interest in roads would suggest . . . . However, most of these
jurisdictions, either by tradition or by default, have reverted to other agencies of government. Police
and welfare functions are performed by the county and state, usually through special administrative
arrangements worked out in state bureaus. Licensing of all kinds falls within the administrative scope
of the clerk, who performs these functions more as an agent of the state than of town government. The
forms and the legal requirements which surround them are derived from state agencies which set
procedures and require reports. In this function the clerk is an administrative arm of the state and much
of what he does in the daily course of business is not known to the other officials of town government.”);
Beverly A. Cigler, County Governance in the 1990s, 27 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 55, 58–59 (1995)
(“Although the elected county commissioners are more heavily involved in [executive] operations than
are city councilmembers, only in counties are specific agencies directly managed by the county
governing body. Commissioners compete with a wide variety of autonomous or partially autonomous
elected and appointed officers, boards, and commissions.” (internal citation omitted)).
121. See, e.g., FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 45–46.
122. See id. at 41–45, 68.
123. See id. at 68, 75.
124. See DILLON, supra note 106, at 55–56.
125. See FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 85; see also James R. Donoghue, County Government and Urban
Growth, 1959 WIS. L. REV. 30, 43 (“Perhaps, the distinguishing feature [in Wisconsin] is that [cities
and villages] are given a broad grant of general power to govern, whereas the county’s powers are listed
in a detailed series of provisions.”).
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Combined with the fact that these legislative powers frequently excluded
control over other county and town officials, the authority that these boards
exercised in practice did not encompass the full affairs of the county or town.126
As time went on, the role of towns also withered. The hybrid system in
the Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states subdivided their counties into towns
in order to balance the competing interests of administrative efficiency
(counties) and local control (towns).127 But subsequent reforms in those states
largely emphasized the former to the detriment of the latter. To be sure,
suburban towns in urbanized areas were eventually given more power and
control, mirroring those of the cities that they surrounded.128 Rural towns,
however, saw many of their powers and responsibilities transferred to the
county, leading to a “weakening of the township as a political institution; and in
some instances this transfer has proceeded to the point where the township has
been virtually or completely eliminated.”129 Consequently, at the same time that
towns became more democratic, their standing in rural life also diminished.
Along with this is the fact that “twenty-five of our states never had townships
and that eleven others never gave them any important powers.”130 Robert
Wuthnow may be right in declaring that “[t]owns are the centerpiece of rural
America,” especially when viewed as what he refers to as “moral
communities.”131 But from a legal standpoint, they serve a distinctly limited
role.
In short, while counties and towns are the main governmental institutions
where rural democracy is practiced, democratic participation was not central to
their initial creation or their subsequent development. By decentralizing state
administration to local units, rural communities are better able to influence the
implementation of state laws and programs than if the state did it entirely on
its own. But this influence was not necessarily exercised by ordinary residents,
nor through formal democratic channels. All of this plays a role in defining the
contemporary role of rural democracy and how rural residents understand their
agency through rural local governments.
B.

The Legal Construction of Counties and Towns in American Law

Democratic participation in rural America is shaped by more than the
types of local governments that were created and the manner in which they were
organized. It is also, as I show here, a product of how these local governments
were defined as a matter of law. In the nineteenth century, all local governments
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
See BRYCE, supra note 88, at 225.
See, e.g., SNIDER, supra note 92, at 43.
Id. at 27, 44.
LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 68–70.
WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 4–5.
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came to be understood as “creatures” of the state. Even as this doctrine was
developed, however, judges continued to distinguish rural local governments
from their urban counterparts in terms of their relationship to their residents.132
Further, when “home rule” was adopted in states across the country to expand
local control and limit state intervention, rural local governments like counties
and towns were largely left out.133 Both of these developments—the legal
construction of local governments and the adoption of home rule—have been
written about extensively from the perspective of cities.134 But as this section
shows, these developments also played an important role in the
conceptualization of rural local governments in American law.
In many ways, the emergence of cities as a “legal concept”135 in the
nineteenth century is tied to the legal construction of rural counties and towns.
For cities, their journey began with the now-curious fact that early English and
American common law drew no legal distinction between municipal
corporations like cities and what we now refer to as private corporations.136 Both
were considered corporate entities chartered by the state.137 As such, both were
believed to wield corporate power derived from their members (as associations)
and their property (as owners).138 It was only when courts began to emphasize
the public-private divide in defining corporations that a unique body of law
reserved for “municipal corporations” took shape. Courts redefined cities as
governmental institutions by equating them with counties and towns,139 which
were presumed to possess few, if any, corporate rights at all, especially against
the state. As Hendrick Hartog explained, “Just as moral reformers worked to
create urban institutions that replicated agrarian values and discipline, so the

132. See, e.g., DILLON, supra note 106, at 29–30.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 163–69.
134. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2278–80 (2003)
[hereinafter Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule].
135. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980)
(tracing the legal history of the city through time).
136. See id. at 1095–96.
137. Id. at 1101–02.
138. See id. at 1097–98.
139. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668–69 (1819)
(“Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations are generally
esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes, and counties;
and in many respects they are so, although they involve some private interests; but strictly speaking,
public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the
whole interests belong also to the government.”); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815)
(“In respect, also, to public corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as counties, towns,
cities, . . . the legislature may, under proper limitations, have a right to change, modify, enlarge or
restrain them, securing however, the property for the uses of those for whom and at whose expense it
was originally purchased.”); see also HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER:
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 193, 200, 210
(G. Edward White ed., 1983).
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makers of the law of municipal corporations worked to make cities conform to
an idealized polity based on the primacy of small-town America.”140
But if courts embraced the legal equivalence between urban and rural local
governments in denying cities many of the private corporate rights that they had
once exercised against the state, they were nevertheless reluctant to accord
counties and towns rights associated with “municipal corporations.” Here, we
come to a second distinction common in American local government law—that
between “municipal corporations” and “quasi-corporations.” Cities (and, in
some states, villages) are the prototypical municipal corporation.141 Counties
and towns, especially those not formally chartered, are differentiated as quasi
corporations.142 And the difference was not just in name; each outlines a
different legal standing with respect to the state.143 Even as state creatures,
municipal corporations possess some degree of independence, especially with
respect to “proprietary” interests and those connected with their ownership and
control of property.144 Quasi corporations, however, were presumed to be
wholly and “involuntary subdivisions of the state created . . . for convenience
and for more expeditious state administration.”145 Thus, in states like
Wisconsin, quasi corporations like counties and towns were prohibited from
directly challenging the constitutionality of a state law,146 creating the office of
a town attorney,147 or invoking constitutional protections against special
legislation.148
Counties were most likely to be construed as quasi corporations, and this
reflects their initial creation as instruments of state power, separate and
detached from the people they govern. In his celebration of local democracy,
Tocqueville hardly mentions counties at all despite the fact that they were
already becoming the predominant form of rural governance in the United

140. HARTOG, supra note 139, at 263.
141. See DILLON, supra note 106, at 29–30.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 28; see also FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 64–65.
144. Indeed, much of the debate surrounding the legal standing of cities has centered on what
aspects of a city’s corporate status still remain, and in what context did it matter. After their
transformation into “state creatures,” cities continued to assert, and courts often recognized, that some
residual corporate rights persisted, especially against state efforts to “take” municipal property. See,
e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1907); HARTOG, supra note 139, at 240, 260.
Even today, when it comes to the issue of municipal liability, courts continue to bifurcate municipal
functions as “governmental” and “proprietary” in deciding the extent to which the state’s sovereign
immunity applies.
145. Curtis v. Eide, 244 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). Indeed, colonial towns,
including those in New England, generally lacked property rights at all. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note
139, at 22 n.3.
146. See Columbia County v. Bd. of Trs. of Wis. Ret. Fund, 116 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Wis. 1962).
147. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Supervisors of Town of Lake, 109 N.W. 564, 564 (Wis. 1906).
148. See Cathcart v. Comstock, 14 N.W. 833, 840–41 (Wis. 1883).
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States.149 Decades later, James Bryce wrote about counties largely as artificial
and administrative constructs of the state, which he contrasted with the towns
of New England.150 Even John Dillon’s influential treatise on the “law of
municipal corporations”—widely recognized as the foundational text of
American local government law—acknowledges counties only to explain why
he considers them outside the scope of his inquiry.151 Counties may be “invested
with a few functions characteristic of a corporate existence,” Dillon remarked,
yet they are at heart “local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign
power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation,
consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them.”152 In other words,
a municipal corporation is “asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it
embraces,” whereas counties are “superimposed by a sovereign and paramount
authority.”153
Towns, on the other hand, have sometimes been treated as corporate
entities, especially in New England.154 Nevertheless, after the legal category of
municipal corporations took shape, they too were frequently relegated to the
category of quasi corporations and deprived the associational rights connected
with corporate status.155 In Wisconsin, for example, courts refused to recognize
unchartered towns as “municipal corporations” as the term is used in the state’s
constitution, referring to them instead as “quasi corporations”156 in the same vein
as counties and school districts.157 In states where towns had corporate status,
like New York, town officials were nevertheless strictly construed as agents of
the state, responsible for duties that “in no respect concern[ed] the strictly
corporate interests of the towns” nor were “limited to their effects on the towns
as political bodies.”158 Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century, even New
England towns began to shed their “peculiar character”159 as independent
political units possessing powers derived from their residents as communal
associations.160 In Maine, for example, where towns are “declared to be a body
politic and corporate by the statute,” courts nevertheless began to classify them
149. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 10, at 86–87.
150. See BRYCE, supra note 88, at 224–25.
151. DILLON, supra note 106, at 29 (“The phrase ‘municipal corporations,’ in the contemplation of
this treatise, has reference to incorporated villages, towns, and cities, with power of local administration,
as distinguished from other public corporations, such as counties and quasi corporations.”).
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 247, 249 (1812).
155. See FAIRLIE, supra note 110, at 167.
156. See Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714, 721–22 (1854).
157. See State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 216 N.W. 509, 510 (Wis. 1927) (counties); Stroud v. City of
Stevens Point, 37 Wis. 367, 371 (1875) (school districts).
158. See Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N.Y. 392, 394–95 (1854).
159. DILLON, supra note 106, at 34–35.
160. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 135, at 1096.
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as “quasi corporations” whose “whole capacities, powers and duties are derived
from legislative enactments.”161
What is striking about the legal distinction between urban and rural local
governments is not just that they endured the emergence of “municipal
corporations” as a concept in American law. It is also that the distinction
persisted even when the basic structure of the state-local relationship was
reformed in later years.
Take, for instance, the widespread adoption of “home rule” at the turn of
the twentieth century.162 For cities, home rule represented a radical expansion of
local autonomy.163 It rejected the traditional view, commonly known as “Dillon’s
Rule,” that local governments could only exercise those powers that had been
specifically delegated to them through statutory authorization by the state.164
Instead, state after state granted cities broad powers to initiate local action on
their own, adopt local regulations, and structure their own government.165
Home rule also imposed limits on state interference, especially with respect to
local affairs.166 To be sure, many scholars (including myself) have argued that
state legislatures and courts have subverted the initial promise of home rule with
workarounds and narrow judicial constructions.167 Yet, it is also the case that
arguments for city power today tend to revolve around some effort to
reinvigorate, reclaim, or restore the local authority that was granted through the
adoption of home rule.168
But as both a movement and a set of legal reforms, home rule largely left
rural America out. A disproportionate number of rural states are among the
minority of those that have not yet adopted home rule into the state
constitution.169 And among those that have adopted home rule, it tends to be
161. Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 377 (1837) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 134, at 2277–88.
163. See, e.g., DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 10–12 (2001).
164. Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269, 307–08 (1968).
165. See GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 78
(1985).
166. See id. at 78–79.
167. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 51 (1999); Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016
BYU L. REV. 177, 181–82; Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181,
193–95 (2017).
168. See, e.g., Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 134, at 2377–82; Stahl, supra note 167, at
184–86.
169. By one estimate, thirteen states have not adopted constitutional home rule for any local
government. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LAWS
GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 20–21 (1993),
https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/M-186.pdf
[https://perma.cc/257H-NVEG]
(including Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New
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reserved for cities, and often the state’s largest.170 In Texas, for example, only
cities with more than 5,000 residents can opt into home rule; counties,
meanwhile, are categorically prohibited regardless of population.171 Both Illinois
and Missouri make similar demographic and categorical distinctions.172 In
Wisconsin, home rule turns on incorporation: incorporated cities and villages
are included, unincorporated localities like counties and townships are not.173
Not surprisingly, most incorporated municipalities in the state are in its
metropolitan regions, whereas unincorporated local governments are largely
found in rural areas.174 Even in states that now grant home rule more broadly,
the expansion to rural local governments only happened later. For example,
when Ohio and New York adopted home rule in the nineteenth century, both
excluded counties and towns; it was only decades later, and through subsequent
constitutional amendments, that counties in both states and towns in New York
were included.175
Even where home rule has been expanded to rural local governments, the
tendency has been to extend it in a much more limited way. For cities, the
promise of home rule centered on the broad delegation of authority—allowing

Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia). Although eleven of these states have
granted some home-rule authority by statute, they differ from their constitutional counterparts because
the home-rule powers can be amended or revoked by the legislature. Among the ten states with the
highest rural population as a percentage of their total population in 2010, half have no constitutional
home rule provision (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Vermont). See 2010 Census Urban
and
Rural
Classification
and
Urban
Area
Criteria,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/2010-urbanrural.html [https://perma.cc/9CPE-HN2V] (linking to an Excel spreadsheet, titled Percent Urban and
Rural in 2010 by State). Nine of the thirteen states without constitutional home rule are in the top half
of states in terms of percentage of rural population. It should also be noted that many “rural” states
that have adopted home rule in name may not have home rule in practice. See KRANE ET AL., supra
note 163, at 16 (analyzing the state of Nebraska as an example).
170. See Vanlandingham, supra note 164, at 278.
171. See ASHLEY D. ROSS, LOCAL DISASTER RESILIENCE: ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 118 (2014). County home rule was temporarily authorized in 1933, but the application
process was so difficult that no county succeeded in becoming a home-rule county. County home rule
was subsequently repealed in 1969. See STEFAN D. HAAG, GARY A. KEITH & REX C. PEEBLES, TEXAS
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICIES 381, 396 (2d ed. 2001).
172. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (setting a population requirement of 25,000 for counties to
qualify for municipal home rule without referendum); MO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a), 19 (setting the
home-rule charter population requirement for counties and cities at 85,000 and 5000, respectively).
173. See LEAGUE OF WIS. MUNICIPALITIES, HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN MUNICIPAL
OFFICIALS 2 (2002), https://icma.org/sites/default/files/301956_Wisconsin%20Handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YW8R-3QR6].
174. See id.
175. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 37 (2004); James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: “The Ghost of Home
Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 725–26 (1985). Indeed, county home rule did not become common
until the 1970s and 1980s. See DAVID K. HAMILTON, GOVERNING METROPOLITAN AREAS:
RESPONSE TO GROWTH AND CHANGE 259 (Richard D. Bingham series ed., 1999).
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cities to take actions and pursue regulations without prior state authorization.176
But as Clyde Snider notes, “[c]ounty home-rule provisions, in contrast, are
confined almost exclusively to matters of charter-making and organizational
forms and do not carry any broad grant of substantive authority over local affairs
generally.”177 To be sure, charter-making authority is not insignificant, especially
given the extent to which states have meddled in the organization of county
governments and the number and type of officials that served. But it has also
meant that, with respect to their policymaking authority, counties must
continue to rely on specific delegations from the state.178
Of course, it is worth noting that rural interest in home rule has never
been strong. It is estimated, for example, that less than ten percent of the
counties that are eligible to adopt a home-rule charter have done so,179 and those
are typically urban counties that are part of major metropolitan regions.180
Additionally, proposals to adopt township home rule in the few states that allow
it are routinely rejected at the polls.181 Perhaps rural residents do not see a need
for local self-governance. Or perhaps they recognize that the limited form of
home rule available to them does not truly enable meaningful local control. As
I have suggested earlier, the functions of rural local governments have
historically been limited, and the practice of rural democracy has never been
strong.182 Moreover, as largely administrative subdivisions, it makes sense that
rural residents would see the question of home rule largely through the lens of
administrative costs and bureaucratic bloat. Indeed, the democratic values of
home rule are seldom discussed at all.

176. See CLARK, supra note 165, at 7.
177. SNIDER, supra note 92, at 104; see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 163, at 478 (displaying a
table showing that the vast majority of county home-rule provisions are limited to “structural” powers
over their governmental form, not “functional” powers regarding policymaking).
178. See, e.g., LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 307–09. Even relatively strong county home-rule
provisions are often weakened by courts in response to state intervention. See, e.g., PETER J. GALIE &
CHRISTOPHER BOPST, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION 242–43 (2d ed. 2012).
179. See HAMILTON, supra note 175, at 259–60.
180. For example, Tennessee allowed for a county home-rule charter in 1965, but only two counties
have passed it. Both of these counties were in urban metropolitan areas and did so in order to prevent
the creation of a metropolitan-wide government through county-city consolidation. KRANE ET AL.,
supra note 163, at 129, 394 (describing Cook County, which is part of metropolitan Chicago, as the only
county in Illinois with home rule).
181. See, e.g., Ad Crable, Martic, Conestoga Township Voters Deny Study of Home Rule,
LANCASTERONLINE (May 19, 2015), https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/martic-conestogatownship-voters-deny-study-of-home-rule/article_5c784146-fe7d-11e4-84a7-c77b5393e528.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3F3-8A4F] (discussing how two townships rejected proposals to adopt township
home rule).
182. See supra Section I.B.
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Reassessing the Practice of Rural Democracy

So were early commentators mistaken about the democratic capacity of
rural local governments? Were Tocqueville and Bryce wrong to celebrate the
rural town as the foundation of American democracy? It is important to
recognize here that the structural and legal constraints described above did not
necessarily foreclose meaningful democratic participation by rural residents.
Artificial jurisdictions may not reflect natural communities on the ground, but
they may nevertheless give rise to “imagined communities” that instill similar
feelings of membership and belonging.183 The administrative orientation of
rural local governments may limit their ability to set policies themselves
through the political process, but local discretion can still be exercised through
the implementation of those policies. And even if rural local governments lack
inherent powers without explicit state authorization, specific powers can still be
gained by petitioning the state for enabling legislation.
Indeed, the early history of rural local governments include many
examples where rural communities were able to exercise a meaningful degree of
local control despite the structural and legal constraints that I described. This
was especially true in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The town hall
meetings of New England may not have initially been designed as a forum for
political negotiation or as a platform for asserting local autonomy. But during
the Revolutionary period, they became powerful vehicles for community selfdetermination and resistance to centralized control.184 County officials were
initially appointed by the state and focused primarily on the implementation and
adjudication of state laws. Yet as Laura Edwards’s study of rural North and
South Carolina in the early nineteenth century reveals, local sheriffs and judges
were attuned to community norms in how they interpreted and applied the law
and often did so to the benefit of disenfranchised residents like slaves and lowerclass whites.185 The lack of a corporate identity for counties and towns also
sometimes cut in favor of rural communities. Governors and state legislatures
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries frequently deferred to rural
communities in deciding which local officials to appoint and what governmental
powers to delegate.186 Moreover, when it came to liability for harms caused by
the local governments themselves, it was precisely because their officials were
legally understood as agents of the state, rather than representatives of their
183. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6–7 (rev. ed. 2006).
184. See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 104, at 220–58.
185. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 7–8 (2009).
186. On appointments, see, for example, WARREN M. BILLINGS, THE OLD DOMINION IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1606–1700, at 97–100 (rev. ed.
2007). On delegation, see DOUGLASS, supra note 97, at 197–200; and Nancy Burns & Gerald Gamm,
Creatures of the State: State Politics and Local Government, 1871-1921, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 59, 70–90 (1997).
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residents, that counties and towns continued to be shielded by the state’s
sovereign immunity in ways that cities were not.187
All of this is to say that in the early nineteenth century, rural communities
found ways to both work around and benefit from their political and legal
constraints. Yet the manner in which this control was exercised also reveals the
early limits of democracy at the local level. The towns of New England might
have become beacons for decentralized authority, but efforts to expand their
structure and practices beyond New England largely failed.188 The role that
counties played in executing state laws allowed local norms to temper their
application, but it was the administrative rather than the political roles of rural
officials that were reinforced in the process.189 Rural local governments and their
officials may have been insulated from liability as a result of their legal
subsidiarity to states, but that also underscored the limited accountability they
owed to their residents.190 All in all, although democratic energy may have
existed on the ground, the early structure of rural local governments channeled
that energy towards administrative responses rather than political action.
Perhaps more important, however, is how the political organization and
legal construction of rural local governments that arose in the nineteenth
century set the trajectory for later. We have already seen that when home rule
was widely adopted at the turn of the twentieth century, counties and towns
were largely excepted or granted home-rule authority on more limited terms.
These early legal distinctions—between different forms of local governments
and contrasting municipal corporations from quasi corporations—would
reappear again in the evolving relationship between rural local governments and
the state and federal governments. It is to this we now turn.
III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE RURAL CONTEXT
The political organization and legal structure of rural local governments
offer one reason why political disaffection is spreading across rural America.
Another reason, which I outline below, is the growing role of the state and
federal government in rural affairs. Over the years, many of the traditional
functions of rural counties and towns have been transferred to state and federal
agencies that are not directly responsive to local constituents. At the same time,
the expansion of state and federal regulations in the twentieth century has not
187. See HARTOG, supra note 139, at 189–90.
188. See Farbman, supra note 114, at 475–77 (describing failed efforts to establish a New England
town system in the South after the Civil War).
189. Moreover, rural residents face growing challenges in accessing the legal system at all. See Lisa
R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 15, 18–23 (2018). In addition, localized judicial systems in rural areas may actually make it more
difficult for rural residents to navigate the legal system because of their use of unique forms, procedures,
and rules. See Sandman & Flagg, supra note 27, at 3–4.
190. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2–4 (1924).
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only been in ways that disproportionately affect rural areas but also in a manner
that displaces the regulatory authority of rural local governments.
To be sure, there are good reasons why rural local governments have ceded
ground in this manner. Yet these developments also shed light on why rural
residents might feel disempowered when it comes to rural affairs, or why they
have turned away from local governments as a means for addressing local
concerns. The problem is not just, as I suggested above, that rural local
governments are currently poor vehicles for democratic participation. It is also,
as I suggest here, that rural residents do not believe that local democratic
participation is meaningful or effective given the increasingly limited role that
rural local governments now play.191
A.

Rural Relationship with the State

When Katherine Cramer ventured into the Wisconsin countryside to write
about rural consciousness in the early 2010s, she was surprised to discover the
strong resentment that rural residents bore against the state.192 After all, Scott
Walker, the governor of Wisconsin at the time, had ascended to office largely
through the support of rural voters.193 It was also widely believed that rural
Wisconsin was disproportionately represented in the state legislature—a
consequence of urban concentration and partisan gerrymandering.194 But
partisan politics and political control were not foremost on the minds of the
rural residents that Cramer encountered. Rather, they spoke about their
frequent interactions with state officials, many of whom they believed
descended on rural communities with little knowledge or concern for the
interests or conditions of local residents.195 As they described it, the state was
hardly the “local” government portrayed in federalism theory and doctrine.196
In their mind, the state was just as remote and coercive as the federal
government.197

191. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 127–30 (describing how state centralization diminished
the power of Vermont towns in the 1960s and the effect it had on the attendance at their traditional
town hall meetings).
192. CRAMER, supra note 32, at 3.
193. See id. at 185–86, 208–09.
194. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018); Michael Wines, How a Wisconsin Case
Before Justices Could Reshape Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/01/us/wisconsin-supreme-court-gerrymander.html [https://perma.cc/8NM2-JY56 (dark
archive)].
195. See CRAMER, supra note 32, at 127–31, 156–58, 195, 201–03.
196. See id. at 127–31 (recounting conversations with rural residents who had experiences with state
government officials in multiple departments that left them with the impression that the government
was out of touch with rural life).
197. See id.
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The experiences and perceptions of rural residents in Wisconsin are not
unique. Indeed, they reflect more broadly how the “rise of states”198 in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries consolidated state authority over rural
areas and how that consolidation displaced the already limited role that rural
local governments played. Rural counties and towns may have long been
construed as agents of the state.199 But as the capabilities of state governments
expanded, it no longer seemed necessary for states to rely on “[t]he sleepy pace
and hayseed rule of the county court houses and rural town halls” in state
administration.200 In managing rural affairs, the state can govern directly. In
regulating rural activities, state laws can substitute for local regulations. All of
this comported with the attitude of the Progressive movement at the turn of
the twentieth century and its emphasis on administrative expertise over political
accountability.201 While many rural communities initially welcomed this shift
and its attendant state resources, the change further eroded the agency rural
residents could exercise over local affairs.
One way in which state governments consolidated their control over rural
governance was by taking over responsibilities that had once been the province
of its local governments. We have already looked at how, in many “hybrid”
states where counties and towns coexisted, town functions were increasingly
transferred to counties.202 But the perceived need for greater efficiency also led
many of those functions to be transferred directly to the state itself. Road
building, which local governments handled throughout the nineteenth century,
was in the twentieth managed primarily by state agencies in rural areas.203 Law
enforcement, which had largely been handled by county sheriffs, was
increasingly supplanted by the rise of the state police.204 The provision of vital
services like water, sewers, and transit were taken from local governments and
given to single-purpose public authorities.205 Even social welfare services, like
“poor relief,” became a matter of state (and eventually federal)
198. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 11–12 (2002).
199. See supra Section II.B.
200. TEAFORD, supra note 198, at 11.
201. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 118, at 9–12; MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF
EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA, 1800–1920, at 8 (1977); see
also BRYAN, supra note 26, at 28–29. Ironically, the Progressive thinkers themselves were quite
enamored with “community values of small-town life.” See PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 378.
202. See supra Section II.A.
203. See, e.g., TEAFORD, supra note 198, at 125–26; Hal S. Barron, And the Crooked Shall Be Made
Straight: Public Road Administration and the Decline of Localism in the Rural North, 1870–1930, 26 J. SOC.
HIST. 81, 82 (1992) [hereinafter Barron, Decline of Localism]. In contrast, cities largely retained their
road-building responsibilities.
204. See H. KENNETH BECHTEL, STATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS 5–6, 40, 49–61 (1995).
205. See ANNMARIE HAUCK WALSH, THE PUBLIC’S BUSINESS: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES
OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 16–17 (1978).
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administration.206 Through each of these reassignments, the role of the state in
rural governance was expanded. The type of institutions that were created to
assume these responsibilities were also more specialized than the generalpurpose governments from which these functions were taken. Moreover, they
were far less politically accountable to local residents. Indeed, in the case of the
state police and public authorities, they were specifically designed to be
insulated from local political demands.207
Institutional reorganization is not the only reason that rural residents
might feel that the state, rather than their local communities, is primarily in
control of rural affairs. Another is the increasing role that state law plays in
displacing local regulations. As Laura Edwards described, the “localized laws”
that rural officials developed in accordance with local norms were, by the late
nineteenth century, largely displaced by the consolidation of what we now know
as the state common law.208 This judicial consolidation also took place at around
the same time that state legislatures began to expand their regulatory reach,
often into areas that had a disproportionate effect on rural communities. In
the early twentieth century, state after state developed comprehensive
regulations with respect to all manner of natural resources—from coal and timber
to fish and game209—and deployed a “veritable army of wardens, foresters,
rangers, scouts, and soldiers to ensure compliance with these measures.”210
Decades later, the rise of the environmental protection movement led to the
widespread adoption of state environmental laws and the creation of state
environmental and conservation agencies dedicated to its enforcement.211 In
many states, the expansion of these state laws meant a displacement of local
regulatory authority. Rather than simply setting a regulatory baseline, the
comprehensive nature of many of these laws led courts to conclude that the state
had “occupied the field,” leaving no room for further regulations at the local

206. See, e.g., LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 276–78.
207. See BECHTEL, supra note 204, at 62; WALSH, supra note 205, at 24–39. Annmarie Walsh
argues that public authorities, contrary to common portrayals, are not necessarily apolitical. Rather,
they simply tend to be attuned to a narrower scope of political interests, such as those of the banking
and business communities and thus result in private control of public management. WALSH, supra note
205, at 334.
208. See EDWARDS, supra note 185, at 203–19.
209. KARL JACOBY, CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: SQUATTERS, POACHERS, THIEVES, AND THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSERVATION 20 (2014) (“For many rural communities, the most
notable feature of conservation was the transformation of previously acceptable practices into illegal
acts . . . .”).
210. Id. at 249; see also RALPH A. WEISHEIT, DAVID N. FALCONE & L. EDWARD WELLS, CRIME
AND POLICING IN RURAL AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 117–18 (3d ed. 2006); David Falcone,
America’s Conservation Police: Agencies in Transition, 27 POLICING 56, 56–57 (2004).
211. See, e.g., EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL:
POLITICS AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTION 61–79 (1993).
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level.212 In some states, like Indiana, home-rule authority was specifically
withheld from matters entrusted to a state agency.213 Thus when local concerns
arose, rural residents had little choice but to turn to the state. In turn, the
administrative bureaucracy of the state, rather than the democratic processes of
local governments, became the primary means by which many rural conflicts
were resolved.
In addition to crowding out through displacement, more and more states
in recent years have also turned to express preemption. Thus far, the rise of
state preemption laws has largely been discussed as a problem facing cities and
their attempt to address “urban” issues.214 But rural local governments are facing
a preemption wave as well and on matters that are dividing their communities.
Nearly all states have enacted “right to farm” statutes that prohibit local
regulation of agricultural and livestock activities, including those targeting
intensive practices associated with agribusiness and industrial livestock
production.215 “Seed laws” prohibiting local regulations of genetically modified
crops have been adopted in twenty-nine states, barring local laws aimed at
protecting organic farmers and those who sell to foreign markets that ban
genetically modified foods.216 The controversy over fracking has produced state
preemption laws on both sides, with some states banning the practice entirely217

212. See, e.g., Ne. Nat. Energy v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *8 (W.
Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).
213. See IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8 (2019) (“[A] unit does not have . . . [t]he power to regulate conduct
that is regulated by a state agency, except as expressly granted by statute.”); see also Triple G Landfills,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fountain Cty., 774 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D. Ind. 1991), aff’d, 977 F.2d 287
(7th Cir. 1992); Bd. of Comm’rs of LaPorte Cty. v. Town & Country Utils., 791 N.E.2d 249, 255–56
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Hopkins v. Tipton Cty. Health Dep’t, 769 N.E.2d 604, 608–09 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
214. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997
(2018); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1469, 1504 (2018). Indeed, state preemption is frequently described as the result of rural
representatives seeking to frustrate the will of urban residents. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home
Rule: Part 1—The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 290 (2016).
215. See, e.g., Nadia S. Adawi, State Preemption of Local Control over Intensive Livestock Operations,
44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10506, 10512–13 (2014) (“Finally, every state has a ‘Right to
Farm’ law that limits private and public nuisance claims against farms, and in recent years, many of
these laws have been broadened to prohibit nuisance claims against even industrial-scale operations
and to explicitly preempt local ordinances governing nuisance actions.”). For an account of local rural
resistance, see CLARK & TEACHOUT, supra note 26, at 51–54.
216. See Kristina Johnson, 29 States Just Banned Laws About Seeds, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/food/2017/08/29-states-just-banned-laws-about-seeds/
[https://perma.cc/9TQS-G5R4]; see also Jacob Garner & Ian Wesley-Smith, State Preemption of Local
GMO Regulation: An Analysis of Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, 47 URB. LAW. 275, 300–03
(2015).
217. See Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York State, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-in-new-yorkstate-citing-health-risks.html [https://perma.cc/A5MV-MX2A (dark archive)].

98 N.C. L. REV. 837 (2020)

872

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

and others categorically exempting it from local regulations.218 Local regulation
of fertilizers,219 the siting of manure storage facilities,220 and pesticides221 has also
come under attack. Even municipal broadband services—which many believe
are the best way to expand internet access in rural communities underserved by
private operators—are now outlawed in four states and severely restricted in
fifteen others.222
B.

Rural Relationship with the Federal Government

The direct control that the state now exercises over many aspects of rural
affairs explains why many rural residents today are frustrated with state
government and its officials. Yet this frustration pales in comparison to the
particular disdain that rural residents have long reserved for the federal
government.223 Common explanations for this tend to center on the “values” of
rural Americans. Given their belief in individualism and self-reliance, we are
told, rural residents naturally scorn “big government.”224 Rooted in insular
communities and accustomed to face-to-face politics, it is said, rural residents
are inherently suspicious of policies made in Washington and the bureaucratic
processes of the administrative state.225
But perhaps the reason for this discontent can also be found in how federal
authority is exercised in rural areas. After all, rural affairs are increasingly
governed by federal law. Rural residents are also more likely than their urban
counterparts to encounter federal regulations and officials in their everyday
lives.226 And the manner in which federal policies are implemented in rural
218. See Russell Gold, Texas Prohibits Local Fracking Bans, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2015, 4:51 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-moves-to-prohibit-local-fracking-bans-1431967882
[https://perma.cc/2B97-28UP (dark archive)].
219. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 39-1-17 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
220. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 15-16-2-50 (2019) (“[A] political subdivision . . . does not have authority
to regulate by ordinance the storage or use of fertilizer material.”)
221. See Terence J. Centner & Davis Clarke Heric, Anti-Community State Pesticide Preemption Laws
Prevent Local Governments from Protecting People from Harm, 17 INT’L J. AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY 118,
119 (2019).
222. See John T. Cobb, Broad-Banned: The FCC’s Preemption of State Limits on Municipal Broadband
and the Clear Statement Rule Comments, 68 EMORY L.J. 407, 416–17 (2018). For an argument on why
even limited state restrictions can have the effect of foreclosing municipal broadband development, see
John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 86, 111 (2009).
223. See, e.g., WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 96.
224. See id. at 98–99; James G. Gimpel & Kimberly A. Karnes, The Rural Side of the Urban-Rural
Gap, 39 PS 467, 468–69 (2006).
225. See, e.g., WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 98–99, 111.
226. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 199–201 (noting that in contrast to rural farmers, “the
urban resident does not find the federal government ‘closest’ to him in terms of services rendered[;
rather, m]ost of the governmental services benefitting him directly are conducted by state and local
authorities even as they are beneficiaries of federal aid in various forms”); see also WEISHEIT ET AL.,
supra note 210, at 118.
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areas, I argue, tends to displace more than support local governments and
officials.227 Federal programs in urban areas have historically been designed with
city partnerships in mind.228 In rural communities, however, that kind of
partnership is rare and routinely eschewed in favor of a more top-down
approach.
If rural residents seem far more concerned about the expansion of the
federal government than city residents, it may be because federal policies have
long played an outsized role in rural affairs. Federal domestic policies in the
nineteenth century were disproportionately focused on the settlement of rural
America—from homesteading, to frontier justice, to Native American
removal.229 Even more targeted regulations followed the expansion of the
federal government in the early twentieth century. Federal policies were
implemented to control agricultural prices and production.230 Federal programs
were designed to spur infrastructure development, such as rural
electrification.231 While national interests led Congress to enact federal
environmental regulations, like the Endangered Species Act of 1973,232 the
impact of those regulations was disproportionately focused on activities and
land use in rural areas.233 Moreover, as interjurisdictional conflicts
proliferated—between states over water access234 and between tribes and local
governments over jurisdiction235—the federal government assumed a more
active role in resolving rural disputes.
Another reason why the federal government looms so large in the
consciousness of rural Americans is its control of federal land. In a country
founded on the private ownership of property, we often forget that the largest
227. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 101–03; see also infra notes 242–49 and
accompanying text.
228. See MOLLENKOPF, supra note 78, at 15–16, 62.
229. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; or, “How the West Was Really
Won,” 34 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1991).
230. See, e.g., JEAN CHOATE, DISPUTED GROUND: FARM GROUPS THAT OPPOSED THE NEW
DEAL AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM 147 (2002); see also WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note
31, at 102–05.
231. See, e.g., RONALD R. KLINE, CONSUMERS IN THE COUNTRY: TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN RURAL AMERICA 153–54 (2000).
232. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884.
233. Claire A. Montgomery, Gardner M. Brown, Jr. & Darius M. Adams, The Marginal Cost of
Species Preservation: The Northern Spotted Owl, 26 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 111, 121–26 (1994);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 305, 346 (1997).
234. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL
EFFORTS TO MANAGE AMERICA’S WATER RESOURCES 64 (2012).
235. See, e.g., LAWRENCE D. BOBO & MIA TUAN, PREJUDICE IN POLITICS: GROUP POSITION,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE WISCONSIN TREATY RIGHTS DISPUTE 48–86 (2006). See generally JANE
M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43324, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW (2013) (discussing the history of federal recognition of tribal courts’ civil and
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers under certain circumstances).
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property owner in the United States is the United States itself.236 More than a
quarter of this country’s landmass is held by the federal government and
managed by the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forestry
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Parks Service.237 Not
only are the vast majority of these holdings in rural areas, but the natural
resources that they contain—fish, game, pastures, fossil fuels, minerals,
timber—are often central to the lifestyle and economies of many rural
communities.238 Some of the controversy surrounds the manner in which federal
land-use decisions are made, including the increasing reliance on bureaucratic
processes and administrative expertise. Others concern the substance of the
decisions themselves, which has become all the more politically charged in
recent decades as national attention and competing local interests are brought
to bear.239 At the same time, rural residents themselves are often divided on the
decisions, as competing rural interests jockey for particular outcomes. Over the
years, various “sagebrush rebellions” have arisen to challenge the federal
government’s ownership and control of federal lands, arguing that they should
instead be sold off or transferred to the control of state or local authorities.240
Sometimes these rebellions have even manifested in acts of violence or
sensational armed standoffs against federal officials by rural residents.241
But for rural residents, the concern with the expansion of federal authority
is not limited to this scope; it is also the manner in which that authority has
been exercised. Here, it is important to recognize that federal policies and local
control are not mutually exclusive. In the early to mid-twentieth century, for
example, federal urban policies on public housing, highway construction, and
urban renewal were implemented through partnerships with city governments
and other local agencies.242 And when it became clear that many of these policies
did more harm than good, they were restructured by Congress to require even
more input by residents and community groups.243 But federal regulations in

236. See, e.g., Sterling Brubaker, Issues and Summary of Federal Land Tenure, in RETHINKING THE
FEDERAL LANDS 1, 1 (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984).
237. See, e.g., HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, WHO IS MINDING THE FEDERAL ESTATE?:
POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS 1, 9–24 (2009).
238. SCOTT LEHMANN, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LANDS 4 (1995); see also Sandra K. Davis, Fighting
over Public Lands: Interest Groups, States, and the Federal Government, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11, 11–13 (Charles Davis ed., 1997).
239. See, e.g., Christopher Ketcham, Opinion, A Trojan Horse Threatens the Nation’s Parks, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/opinion/national-parks-threatenedutah.html [https://perma.cc/TF2H-NUXY (dark archive)].
240. See, e.g., JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, GREEN BACKLASH: THE HISTORY AND
POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. 171–89 (1997).
241. See Michael Kimmel & Abby L. Ferber, “White Men Are This Nation:” Right-Wing Militias and
the Restoration of Rural American Masculinity, 65 RURAL SOC. 582, 586, 591 (2000).
242. See MOLLENKOPF, supra note 78, at 3, 6–7, 180–81.
243. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 46–49.
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rural areas have historically opted for a more direct and top-down approach.244
Federal officials tend to operate parallel to local officials, rather than in
partnership with them or through them as intermediaries.245 This is certainly
the case with environmental regulations and enforcement.246 There is also the
proliferation of “federally engineered local governments” operating in rural
areas independent from rural local governments247—a development that led one
observer in the 1940s to note that “the federal government was on the way to
establishing its own system of local government to match that of the state.”248
Indeed, Morton Grodzins argues that the government closest to the people in
rural areas is clearly the federal government, at least with respect to the
provision of services.249 All of this is further evidence of the limited role that
rural local governments play in our federal system. While the federal
government recognizes that few urban issues can be addressed at the national
level without the participation of city governments and leaders, it is largely
understood that such local participation is entirely unnecessary with respect to
federal regulation in rural America.

244. See, e.g., CHOATE, supra note 230, at 147. But see GRANVILLE HICKS, SMALL TOWN 213–17
(2004) (offering a more nuanced view of the Tennessee Valley Authority and democracy); DAVID E.
LILIENTHAL, TVA DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 3–6 (8th ed. 1944).
245. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 191–92.
246. Indeed, as a study of counties in Idaho reported, “[r]ural county commissioners see a higher
level of environmental conflict as well as a more conflictual relationship with state and federal agencies
tasked with environmental protection.” Leslie R. Alm & Stephanie L. Witt, The Rural-Urban Linkage
to Environmental Policy Making in the American West: A Focus on Idaho, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 271, 280 (1997).
This may also be tied to the fact that rural county commissioners saw environmental protection as a less
important issue relative to their urban counterparts. Id.
247. GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). Grodzins does note that
the leadership of many of these “federally engineered local governments” are selected through local
elections. See id. at 192. But it is interesting to note that the nominations and elections are separate
from the existing rural local government with which they run parallel. Moreover, these largely rural
institutions contrast with the largely urban institutions that fall under a separate category in Grodzins’s
typography, in which the city leaders act as intermediaries and administrators for the federal program.
See id. at 192–93.
248. PAUL N. YLVISAKER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT THE GRASS ROOTS: A
STUDY OF BLUE EARTH COUNTY, MINNESOTA, TO 1946, at 42 (William Anderson & Edward W.
Weidner eds., 1956). Grodzins notes that the Department of Agriculture is primarily responsible for
these “little governments.” See GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 191. Even today, agricultural policies are
largely the product of lobbying by agricultural interest groups—often representing the largest corporate
growers—rather than individual residents represented by their counties or towns. See Alexis Guild &
Iris Figueroa, The Neighbors Who Feed Us: Farmworkers and Government Policy—Challenges and Solutions,
13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 157, 159–60 (2018); Ian T. Shearn, Whose Side Is the American Farm Bureau
on?, NATION (July 16, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/whose-side-american-farm-bureau/
[https://perma.cc/R3SN-V7ST (staff-uploaded archive)].
249. See GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 199 (“Where in the American system is government closest
to the people as a provider of services? The answer is clearly in the rural areas, and there it is the federal
government that provides more services to the people it serves than any other governments provide
for the people they serve.”).

98 N.C. L. REV. 837 (2020)

876

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

It also doesn’t help that the types of issues where federal intervention is
most common are those associated with the urban-rural divide.250 Restrictions on
water usage in agricultural communities are implemented in order to ensure
that water is available for city residents downstream.251 Rural land use is limited,
it is widely believed, in order to protect endangered species and urban
sensibilities.252 And when decisions are made by states about where to dispose
of, say, low-level radioactive waste—much of which is created in urban hospitals
and universities and in accordance with federal statute—the choice is often in
rural communities.253 All of this fuels the impression that federal regulations are
for the interests of those living somewhere else. Few of these decisions are made
in meaningful consultation with rural communities or their representatives.
C.

Reassessing Intergovernmental Relations in the Rural Context

The democratic capacity of rural local governments, I have suggested, is
constrained not only by their internal governance but also by the expansion of
federal and state involvement in rural affairs. My goal, however, is not to
disparage this expansion; there are good reasons why previously local functions
are now handled by the state. Indeed, in many cases, the involvement of the
state was welcomed by the rural communities themselves.254 Moreover, I do not
question the importance of state and federal regulations on issues such as the
environment or natural resources, even if they happen to impact rural parts of
the country more than other places. Instead, my goal here is more limited: to
illustrate why rural residents might feel especially disempowered with respect
to local affairs, and why this feeling of disempowerment is often connected to
state and federal policies.
From this perspective, it is worth recognizing that administrative and
regulatory centralization, even if thought necessary, is not without its costs. And
those costs have democratic implications. First, rural interests and practices
were often displaced as a result of centralization. As Hal Barron noted, state
control of road building meant that the farm-to-market routes preferred by local
residents gave way to roads that prioritized cross-state travel.255 Second,
250. See James B. Wadley & Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land Use Controls in Rural
Areas: Whose Land Is It Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 331, 345 (1993) (describing the view that
land-use regulations exist to “keep rural areas pure and unspoiled for urban purposes”).
251. See Michael Wines, West’s Drought and Growth Intensify Conflict over Water Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/us/wests-drought-and-growth-intensifyconflict-over-water-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8T67-DDEB (dark archive)].
252. See Montgomery et al., supra note 233, at 111, 126–27.
253. See DANIEL J. SHERMAN, NOT HERE, NOT THERE, NOT ANYWHERE: POLITICS, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, AND THE DISPOSAL OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 47, 123 (2011); see also Su,
Intrastate Federalism, supra note 80, at 224–26.
254. See Barron, Decline of Localism, supra note 203, at 97.
255. Id. at 95. Many rural communities favored greater involvement by the state because of the
funding it provided to supplement road-building costs. However, because rural residents were often
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democratic influence was also undermined and sometimes purposefully so. Both
the creation of the state police and public authorities, for example, were intended
to limit the social and political influence of rural residents in how laws were
enforced256 and services provided.257 Third, centralized control severed the
social connection between governmental services and the people that they
served. Despite the many advantages that state administration of social welfare
services offered, for example, Lane Lancaster maintains that there might still
be an argument for the local welfare administration: “Men and women who, in
the intimacy of the rural neighborhood, know something about the deserts of
their fellow-citizens, may judge better than a distant bureau chief when
benevolence is justified.”258 Indeed, this might explain why rural residents
frequently oppose welfare even when their communities are reliant on it—
divorced from the local context, they fixate on the undeservingness of those
“out there.”259
If one set of concerns involves the responsiveness of rural policies to local
interests, another is the effect that centralization has on the role of rural local
governments as a forum for negotiating political conflicts. In other words, it
reduces the range of issues that rural residents can turn to their local
governments to address and limits their experiences with navigating political
conflicts on their own. Of course, we often do not recognize the extent to which
local conflicts exist. We assume that because farming is important in rural
communities, “right to farm” statutes are inherently “pro-rural.” Similarly,
because environmental regulations are said to threaten certain rural industries,
we assume that they are inherently “anti-rural.” But at the local level, rural
interests are often divided. The reason why “right to farm” statutes are needed
at all is because many rural communities are divided over agricultural and
livestock practices—a divide that splits conventional farmers from organic
farmers or agribusinesses from family operations.260 While the employment of

labor-rich but capital-poor, the move to taxation to round out the funding eventually imposed greater
costs on rural residents despite the overall efficiency that it enabled. See id. at 85.
256. See BECHTEL, supra note 204, at 54–55, 62.
257. Public authorities are quasi governmental subdivisions, often created for a single purpose and
usually serving a broad jurisdiction much larger than counties. They are not considered general-purpose
governments like cities, counties, or towns. Modeled after private corporations, they are often led by a
board of directors appointed directly by the state or elected on the basis of property ownership rather
than individual votes. See WALSH, supra note 205, at 5. Moreover, their funding often comes from the
imposition of user fees and assessments rather than taxes. Id. at 4.
258. LANCASTER, supra note 101, at 284.
259. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 45, at 137–40.
260. See Leah Douglas, Big Ag Is Pushing Laws To Restrict Neighbors’ Ability To Sue Farms, NPR
(Apr. 12, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2019/04/12/712227537/big-ag-ispushing-laws-to- restrict-neighbors-ability-to-sue-farms [https://perma.cc/8MND-ZR6K]; Factory
Farms, FAMILY FARM DEFENDERS, http://familyfarmers.org/?page_id=62 [https://perma.cc/H5UCS9UX]; Kristofor Husted, Missouri Constitutional Amendment Pits Farmer Against Farmer, NPR (Aug. 6,
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some rural residents may be affected by state and federal environmental
regulations, those regulations may also be seen by other rural residents as
necessary to protect their health or livelihood. What this means is that some
rural interests are likely to be served whenever the state or federal government
intervenes. But because decisions are often made at the state and federal level,
rural residents are foreclosed from the experience of negotiating, on their own,
the tensions within their communities. Rather than turning to one another in
resolving local conflicts, regulatory centralization encourages them to petition
directly to higher authorities.
The extent to which these local democratic interests should be balanced
against the state and national interests at stake is open to debate. What we often
overlook, though, is that there are any local democratic interests worth
considering at all in the rural context. The result is the continued erosion of
rural local governments as vehicles for deliberative democracy or meaningful
self-actualization. It is no wonder then why rural residents feel disaffected and
disempowered and harbor antigovernmental sentiments.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW RURAL DEMOCRACY
The plight of rural America today, I have argued, is rooted both in the
decline of rural communities and the disaffection of rural residents. Both their
decline and disaffection, I have suggested, is tied to the democratic deficit of
rural local governments and their limited ability to channel the interests of their
residents. Taken together, efforts to address the suffering of rural communities
in the short term should be joined with efforts to expand their democratic
capacity in the long term. But is local empowerment still possible in the rural
context? Would it be effective in addressing rural decline or even welcomed by
rural residents themselves? I consider each of these questions in turn.
A.

Possible?

It is difficult to imagine how the democratic capacity of rural local
governments can be enhanced without addressing the legal and political
structures that define their role. Yet it is also difficult to imagine how the legal
and political structure of rural local governments can change given its long and
deep roots in American history. After all, the erosion of local democracy in rural
America draws in part from the initial organization of rural local governments
and the persistence of that organization over the years. Moreover, to the extent
that the limited role of towns and counties have been further displaced by the
expansion of state and federal authority, one might question whether this
consolidation can be rolled back. But even if we are unlikely to recapture the
2014, 5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/08/06/338127707/missouri-s-right-tofarm- amendment-pits-farmer-against-farmer [https://perma.cc/82FH-DQGG].
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kind of rural democracy celebrated by Tocqueville and Bryce in the nineteenth
century, I believe that meaningful steps can be taken to broaden the democratic
capacity of rural local governments and restore to rural residents a greater sense
of agency and control over their lives and their communities.
Indeed, meaningful steps can be taken at the state and federal level that
do not require wholesale transformation of the basic legal and political
organization of counties and towns. At the most basic level, rural local
governments could simply be given a more prominent role in the design and
implementation of state and federal policies. Programs intended to tackle rural
problems could be designed to allow communities to channel the resources into
what they feel are the root problems and experiment with what they believe
might be effective solutions. The “notice and comment” procedure for proposed
regulations can also deliberately solicit comment from affected rural
communities, rather than relying on the traditional feedback system that is so
often co-opted by special interest organizations and business lobbies. Small
reforms like these might restore some of the agency and control that rural
residents feel they have lost, especially as the policy avenues for addressing local
problems increasingly run through distant bureaucracies. And for state and
federal policymakers, courting rural local governments as experts and partners
might also make for more effective policies. Tailored responses to the rural drug
epidemic might be possible if communities had more say in what kinds of
initiatives to fund,261 or whether to tackle opioids versus methamphetamines.262
Efforts to improve rural healthcare access might benefit from local experience
with respect to how best to recruit, train, and retain healthcare providers, or
whether to fund regional hospitals or local clinics. Expansion of rural broadband
might be accelerated if rural local governments are seen as potential internet
providers and supported as such. More importantly, as general-purpose
governments, counties and towns might even help develop innovative
approaches that tackle these and other rural problems as interrelated rather than
separate issues.
What interests me in these kinds of reforms is not only how policymaking
at the state and federal level might better accommodate rural interests but also
the effect it may have on the role and perception of rural local governments
themselves. Rather than simply entities to which taxes are paid and from which
services are provided, rural residents might begin to see their local governments
as a forum for shaping state and federal policies and the manner in which they
are implemented. In turn, local leaders may come to see their responsibility as
261. See Strach et al., supra note 75.
262. See Carmen Heredia Rodriguez, Elizabeth Lucas & Orion Donovan-Smith, Federal Grants
Restricted to Fighting Opioids Miss the Mark, States Say, NPR (June 13, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/06/13/731512068/federal-grants-restricted-tofighting-opioids-miss-the-mark-states-say [https://perma.cc/GTZ3-7ACJ].
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involving more than how best to comply with state and federal mandates but
also how to negotiate, represent, and give voice to the varied political interests
of their communities. Through their local governments, rural communities
might begin to find their collective voice and a platform for its expression. What
is our community’s position on Medicaid expansion and the anticipated effect
it might have on our neighbors? What is our community’s official comment on
proposed regulations regarding hydraulic fracturing and water safety, especially
with respect to the economy and health? Rural residents are already debating
questions like these in diners and coffee shops across the country. But the
experience of arriving at a collective position—working through disagreements
among neighbors where all sides are situated within a shared local context—
might provide an avenue for communal self-determination that is otherwise
lacking.
If rural local governments are to play a more significant role in enhancing
the democratic capacity of rural communities, then they must actually be
representative of those communities. In other words, a second set of reforms
might seek to ensure a better fit between rural communities and rural
governance. Part of this might require adjusting the physical boundaries that
delineate one rural local government from the next. Perhaps, like the decennial
redistricting of legislative districts, state legislatures might review and redraw
county and township boundaries that have, in many cases, persisted since
colonial times.
Alternatively, legal avenues might be created for rural communities to
establish or redefine local government boundaries on their own—whether
through some form of rural reincorporation or a negotiated process by which
county and township borders are readjusted. Steps might also be taken to “right
size” rural local governments to fit rural communities of interest. In some states,
counties may be too large to serve as the government closest to the people. In
others, towns and townships might be too small. I do not presume that an
“optimal size” exists; geography, tradition, culture, and local economies vary, and
each affects how residents define their communal boundaries. What is
important is to start thinking about the structure of rural local governments
with an eye towards their democratic potential. Indeed, establishing political
jurisdictions that align with natural communities may be even more important
today as the gerrymandering of state and federal legislative districts increasingly
eschews geographic and community ties in favor of partisan advantage.
Aside from the physical jurisdiction of rural local governments, another
aspect worth considering is their internal governance. What might be done to
both ensure and enhance the participation of rural residents in their local
governments? At the most basic level, this means that the vote should not be
diluted or denied, especially when it comes to historically underrepresented
minorities. In communities where the immigrant population is growing, steps
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might be taken to expand the local franchise to include noncitizens, or at least
ensure that their voices are represented in local decisionmaking. It might even
be time to consider whether the tradition of the New England town hall—where
all residents have the opportunity to assume a direct role in local
policymaking—might be revived and finally exported beyond the New England
states. Beyond voting, it might also be necessary to reexamine the structural
organization of rural local governments themselves. Designed as administrative
subdivisions of the state, many county and town governments continue to be
organized around officials and offices that operate independent of one another
and at a distance from the political process. The effect, however, is to make it
difficult for rural residents to navigate these competing spheres, know which
official to hold to account, and coordinate policy responses across these
independent silos.263 And this fragmentation is even worse once we factor in
the jurisdictional divide between rural counties and towns and their relationship
with public authorities and state agencies. Ironically then, decentralizing power
to rural local governments may involve increased centralization of the local
governments themselves.
Third, the baseline powers of rural local government might be increased.
Home rule could be expanded to cover more rural local governments and on the
same terms as their urban counterparts. More power and authority can be
granted to rural counties and towns to enact laws and regulations, especially on
issues that affect their communities. State preemption statutes, especially those
that simply deny local governments the ability to regulate entirely, might be
rolled back. The goal here is not just to empower rural local governments; it is
also to convince rural residents that engagement through local politics is
worthwhile. At the very least, rural local governments might provide a forum
through which local grievances can be aired and conflicts can be negotiated. In
time, it may also lead to the kind of policy innovations and experimentation
that have long been associated with true and meaningful decentralization.
Indeed, in thinking about how to reallocate power between the state and
rural local governments, it may be that we need to rethink the traditional
political-administrative divide between the two. There is a certain irony to how
the current system is set up. We assume that politics and policymaking is the
263. See DOUGLASS, supra note 97, at 193–94 (“In each civil unit down to the smallest the division
of responsibility tends to be exact and minute. Not only does the distinction between the executive,
legislative and judicial departments of government obtrude into the civil machinery of the little town,
but such matters as schools, libraries and public health are taken ‘out of politics’ and delegated to other
and various hands. In consequence there is a multitude of minor officials, all inexpert, performing small
functions informally and incidentally while carrying on private vocations. . . . Now civic improvement
must use such officials as American local government furnishes. It must struggle with cumbersome and
divisive machinery. It must work through a bewildering variety of local officials, many of them not
primarily elected by the town’s people, nor directly amenable to civic purpose. It needs at least to be
disentangled from this embarrassing complexity of jurisdiction.”).
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province of states. If rural local governments have a role, it is largely concerned
with the implementation of state policies, the delivery of services, and
increasingly—with the rise of “unfunded mandates” from the federal
government and the state—the need to raise revenue to accomplish those
charges.264 Given this divide, it is no wonder that critics of rural local
governments abound. As Progressive reformers argued at the turn of the
twentieth century, rural local governments have neither the expertise nor
economy of scale to implement policies or deliver services efficiently.265 From
this perspective, it makes sense why so many argue that instead of empowering
rural towns or townships, more of them should be abolished.
But administrative efficiency might simply be the wrong metric. As noted
earlier, many of the challenges facing rural America require political
negotiations. Even if the funding and delivery of services can be done more
efficiently at the state or federal level, local political processes can still be useful
in setting priorities and tailoring their implementation. More importantly, rural
local governments may be a useful forum for determining what kinds of services
are necessary and what kind of investments should be made. This, no doubt, will
require an expansive reconceptualization of the role of counties and towns—one
that contrasts sharply with how they were initially imagined and have developed
over time. It will also require a reorientation of how we understand state and
federal authority, which we often assume is responsible for political decisions
that are then carried out by local government units. But politics at the local level
is important, and the sense of agency and control that it imparts should not be
overlooked in the name of administrative efficiency and expertise.
Each set of reforms that I have proposed for rural local governments—
increasing their role in state and federal policymaking, increasing their
democratic capacity, and expanding their political power—are meaningful in and
of themselves. But it is also important to recognize that all three are
interrelated. It is unlikely, for example, that rural local government can be an
effective partner in the design and implementation of state and federal
programs if they are not also recognized by rural residents as a meaningful
sphere for political participation. They are also not likely to be a meaningful
sphere for political participation if they are not organized or structured in a way
to empower rural residents and offer some concrete means by which they can
enact policies. And of course, in a world where the fate of rural America is
affected by state and federal policies, true local empowerment comes from not
just independent authority but also through the ability of rural local
governments to affect state and federal policymaking. In short, we need not
264. See J. Edwin Benton, The Impact of Structural Reform on County Government Service Provision,
84 SOC. SCI. Q. 858, 859–60 (2003).
265. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 10, at 85–86.

98 N.C. L. REV. 837 (2020)

2020]

DEMOCRACY IN RURAL AMERICA

883

accept rural local governments as they currently exist. It may be necessary to
reconsider their role in a more expansive and holistic fashion.
B.

Effective?

Even if a reinvigoration of rural democracy is possible, would it be
effective in addressing or reversing rural decline? In other words, what are the
chances that local empowerment can lead to beneficial policies or meaningful
reform? Indeed, if rural local governments have thus far been absent in
discussions about addressing the plight of rural America, it is because there is
widespread doubt that there is anything that they can do. Lacking resources and
expertise, it is not clear how local leaders can effectively respond to the suffering
of their residents. Given their jurisdictional limits, rural local governments also
seem ill-suited to dealing with the increasingly national and international roots
of rural decline. Moreover, even if enthusiasm for “localism” is growing,
especially as a response to partisan gridlock at the federal level, most of that
enthusiasm today is centered on cities.266 Rural counties and towns do not
attract the same kind of experts that fill the ranks of city administrations. They
do not have the charitable foundations and business communities that have
historically supported urban initiatives with private dollars. A solution to the
rural crisis then appears only possible through policies at the national or state
level. And if that solution is to be successfully implemented, more centralized
control, not less, seems necessary over the administrative function of rural local
governments.
I do not deny the challenges that rural local governments face or the need
for rural-centered policies at the state and federal level. But the reality is that
aside from the attention that rural America receives during electoral cycles,
their struggles and concerns rarely factor into policymaking at higher levels. If
anyone is concerned about rural communities in America today, it is the rural
communities themselves. In addition, the ability to address local issues at the
local level is all the more important in the rural context because of the different
sets of challenges that they face. There is no guarantee that a national or even
statewide rural policy can be developed to address the diversity of rural
economies, demographic trends, and cultural contexts in which solutions are
needed. Resources and expertise are helpful, but they cannot wholly
compensate for the kind of local knowledge that ordinary residents possess or

266. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL
NATIONS, RISING CITIES (2013) (explaining how cities can and do save the world); BRUCE KATZ &
JEREMY NOWAK, THE NEW LOCALISM: HOW CITIES CAN THRIVE IN THE AGE OF POPULISM
(2017) (describing the advent of new localism mainly in terms of city growth and governance);
RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE (2016) (advocating
for broader city power).
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the kind of cultural fluency that is so often required for policies to be effectively
implemented in a given community.267
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the benefits commonly associated
with decentralization apply any differently once we move from the urban to the
rural context. We have already discussed how empowering rural local
governments might allow for the development of tailored policies fitted to a
particular context. Equally important, in my mind, is the possibility that rural
local governments might engage in the kind of policy experimentation and
innovation that is currently taking place in urban settings. Rather than relying
on a national policy or corporate initiatives, rural communities themselves
might be given more leeway to experiment with how best to expand access to
broadband internet service, address public health concerns,268 or promote food
security.269 Some of these experiments will fail, but others might succeed. Some
may serve as templates for state or national policies, while others might simply
be what works in a particular community. We should not forget that many of
the most successful rural policies in the past have been adapted from local
practices. Even if local policy experimentation does not produce a model that
can be exported, the widespread proliferation of varying local solutions might,
as a whole, constitute precisely the kind of national strategy that we need.
Moreover, policy tailoring and experimentation may be all the more
important in rural areas today because of the dramatic change that they are
experiencing. The challenges that many rural communities face is not just the
erosion of their traditional economic, demographic, and cultural identities but,
more importantly, how these developments require rural communities to
reinvent and redefine themselves. As many researchers are now pointing out,
resilient communities are not those that can resist change. Instead, as the pace of
economic restructuring and technological innovations quicken, resilience often
lies in the capacity of a community to adapt. This kind of adaptation, in my view,
is only possible if local communities are willing and if local residents feel they
have some voice in the direction that it takes. This kind of buy-in and agency, I
believe, requires a robust local forum in which different visions of the
community can be debated and negotiated. This is already happening to some
degree, as many rural communities have redirected local economic development
efforts in search of avenues for future revitalization—whether it be recreation
and tourism, advanced manufacturing, farm-to-table agriculture, or even “server
267. See Jack Kloppenburg, Jr., Social Theory and the De/Reconstruction of Agricultural Science: Local
Knowledge for an Alternative Agriculture, 56 RURAL SOC. 519, 529 (1991).
268. See Staci Matlock, A Team on Their Side, MEDIUM (July 1, 2016), https://medium.com/smalltowns-big-change/a-team-on-their-side-e8459eba6f25 [https://perma.cc/AAJR2-5P2H].
269. See generally JOEL SALATIN, EVERYTHING I WANT TO DO IS ILLEGAL: WAR STORIES
FROM THE LOCAL FOOD FRONT (2007) (describing local efforts to deregulate local food sales in rural
areas to encourage more farm-to-table access).
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farms” connected to cloud computing. But local democratic participation might
also be important for those communities facing insurmountable odds and what
appears to be inevitable decline. How should a community “downsize” or “rightsize” to better accommodate the new baseline? What support should be given
to assist rural residents where they are, and how much should be dedicated to
helping them find opportunities elsewhere? These debates are already
happening in policy circles at the highest levels of government, but it might still
be helpful to give some meaningful voice to the communities themselves.
It would be naive, of course, to assume that true self-determination is
possible in our interconnected world. But expanding the capacity for individuals
to exercise some agency over their lives or participate in making decisions
affecting their communities is still a worthwhile goal.270 Indeed, democratic
capacity may be even more important in rural communities given the political
nature of so many of the challenges that they face. Sure, deprivation is the lens
through which the contemporary rural crisis is ordinarily perceived: the loss of
jobs, the departure of people, and the decline in cultural norms. The way
forward, however, depends on not only restoring what has been lost but also
engaging in serious conversations about how rural communities will reinvent
and reimagine themselves for the twenty-first century. What will be the new
rural economy, and how will it be structured? Who will be a part of the new
rural community, and how will that identity be constructed? What will be the
values and culture that define rural America, and how will those be established
and maintained? There is no reason to believe that all rural communities will
follow the same path. The need for reinvention, and the manner in which it
might be carried out, also varies from one community to another. Moreover, for
any changes to be effective, buy-in from rural residents will be necessary. There
is no shortage of top-down reforms that have failed to penetrate because of
resistance from those they intend to help. Increasing the capacity for bottomup approaches not only instills residents themselves with ownership and agency,
it also makes it more likely that meaningful reforms can be carried out.271
270. See DAHL & TUFTE, supra note 65, at 140 (“It seems evident to us that among the units most
needed in the world as it is has been evolving lie several at the extremes: we need some very small units
and some very large units. . . . Very large units that transcend the parochialism and inadequate system
capacity of the nation-state are evolving, but too slowly—quite possibly too slowly for human survival.
If the giant units are needed for handling transnational matters of extraordinary moment, very small
units seem to us necessary to provide a place where ordinary people can acquire the sense and the
reality of moral responsibility and political effectiveness in a universe where remote galaxies of leaders
spin on in courses mysterious and unfathomable to the ordinary citizen.”); HICKS, supra note 244, at
193 (“To me the problem of practical democracy in a large and complex society seems exceedingly
difficult, and it is not going to be solved by slogans. The very difficulty of that problem, however,
makes me all the more certain that people should have as much power as possible over the things that
directly affect their lives.”).
271. See Linda Lobao & David Kraybill, Poverty and Local Governments: Economic Development and
Community Service Provision in an Era of Decentralization, 40 GROWTH & CHANGE 418, 444–46 (2009).
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All of this is to say that effectiveness of rural policies should not be judged
based on whether a “solution” to the rural crisis can be found, much less one
that would work for all rural communities. Equally important is the process by
which rural policies are made. Here we have to remember that in addition to
the policy challenges that rural America now faces are the political challenges of
reimagining rural communities for the twenty-first century.
C.

Desired?

My assessment of rural democracy thus far has largely focused on the
structure of local governance. More specifically, I have argued that the limited
role of counties and towns as meaningful forums for democratic participation is
one reason why political disaffection is so pervasive in rural areas. But do rural
residents actually want a more expansive role for local governments? Is this the
kind of “democracy” that is desired in rural America? After all, rural residents
often reject reform efforts to expand the authority of their counties and
towns.272 Rural voter turnout at the local level has historically been lower than
in urban areas.273 Moreover, most accounts of rural disaffection do not center
on local governments at all.
Indeed, given the values and norms commonly associated with rural
culture, perhaps “government” is the wrong place to look for rural democracy.274
The self-reliance and individualism prized by rural residents, some argue, make
it difficult for them accept governmental assistance or put faith in collective
action.275 The hierarchical organization of rural life, others note, engenders a
deference to authority276 that undermines grassroots political participation. It is
also argued that because rural communities have historically been bound
together by ethnic, religious, and cultural ties,277 there is little common ground
for political negotiations when those communities find themselves fractured by
diversity and inequality. From these perspectives, rural disaffection simply
reflects the disconnect between traditional rural culture and the new realities
facing rural America.
272. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 201.
274. Rather, rural “democracy” is commonly tied to the communities in which rural residents are
embedded. It is through norms, not regulations, that communal obligations are established. It is
primarily through social sanctions, not governmental enforcement, that communal expectations are
maintained. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1994) (referring to these norms as “order without laws”); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE DEMOCRACY OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN AMERICA (2016) (describing the
social interactions that constitute the “democracy of everyday life”).
275. See, e.g., HICKS, supra note 244, at 217–18.
276. See, e.g., MARC J. HETHERINGTON & JONATHAN D. WEILER, AUTHORITARIANISM AND
POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 33–42, 60 (2009).
277. See, e.g., JON GJERDE, THE MINDS OF THE WEST: ETHNOCULTURAL EVOLUTION IN THE
RURAL MIDDLE WEST, 1830–1917, at 247 (1997).
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I believe that understanding rural culture and identity is central to
understanding democracy in rural America. Nevertheless, I think it is equally
important to recognize the limits of describing rural disaffection solely through
generalization about rural culture and identity. Part of the problem is that, once
extrapolated into broad principles and values, contradictions are inevitable.278 It
is difficult to reconcile, especially in the abstract, rural pride in individualism
with rural commitments to community, or the values placed on self-reliance with
traditional deference to authority. Like all cultural representation, different
facets of rural culture tend to manifest in different situations. The popularity
of the Tea Party in rural America led many to conclude that rural residents
believed in small government and an even smaller social safety net. But the rise
of the populist wave that gave way to the election of Donald Trump reflected
yet another view of rural residents—one that sought even more governmental
intervention and support in bolstering rural industries and aid for rural
residents. The same contradictions, I argue, exist in how rural residents see
democracy.
But even if norms rather than laws serve as the foundations of rural
governance, I believe it is important to recognize the degree to which those
norms are shaped by the structural organization of local governments. If rural
residents have learned to depend on themselves rather than the government, it
might be because the counties and towns that serve rural areas have become such
poor vehicles for collective action.279 If rural residents draw a sharp
distinction between community support and governmental assistance, part of
the reason may lie in the manner in which rural local governments have
historically been structured—not as a representative of their community but as
an administrative agent of central governments. And there is reason to
believe that the experiences of rural residents with their local governmental
institutions shape their perspectives of democracy as a whole. After all, local
governments have long been described as a “schoolhouse” for democracy.280 It
is the daily interactions of citizens with the lowest level of government, many
argue, that define what it means to be a citizen in our democratic system.
But if democratic capacity is lacking at the local level, is it that surprising
that faith in democracy as a whole is waning in rural communities?

278. For an exploration of the complexities of and tensions within rural politics, see Loka Ashwood,
Rural Conservatism or Anarchism? The Pro-State, Stateless, and Anti-State Positions, 83 RURAL SOC. 717,
733–36 (2018).
279. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 49, at 209 (“Frustration of scope of control, if a universal of
the American system, is nevertheless felt most acutely in the small local governments of rural
America.”).
280. See, e.g., BRYCE, supra note 88, at 261 (“[T]he Town or township with its popular primary
assembly is . . . the most educative to the citizens who bear a part in it. The Town meeting has been
not only the source but the school of democracy.”).
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Indeed, it may be that formal democratic institutions are more important
today precisely because the foundations of informal rural governance are
deteriorating. Rural residents complain that community ties are fraying—
unraveled by years of rural depopulation and the rise of inequality and
growing diversity. They are chafing against the influence of corporations and big
businesses, many of which they believe are detached from the local communities
in which they operate. All of this undermines the ability of rural communities to
shape their own development through communal norms. Yet this may be
precisely the void that local government institutions can fill. In communities
that can no longer rely on ethnic, religious, or cultural ties to resolve conflicts
and disputes, local governments might provide precisely the kind of neutral
forum that is needed and where grievances can be aired. Local democracy might
serve as the “civil religion”281 that allows rural residents to continue to see
themselves as a community and act as a collective whole. Local regulations
might be used to control rural activities undertaken by actors that are not
susceptible to social sanctions. All of this, of course, would require a rethinking
of how rural local governments are currently organized and their role in rural
life. But perhaps this rethinking is all the more necessary precisely because the
foundations of informal rural governance are eroding.
I have suggested here that rural local governments might be the basis for
building a new rural identity. I have argued that local governments might be the
bridge that is necessary to achieve a new, and perhaps more inclusive, definition
of rural communities. But is that likely to happen? Given the fierce partisan
divide that has dominated American politics at the state and national level, can
we expect local democracy to do more than simply reflect the growing fault lines
in rural America—between older-timers and newcomers,282 between ethnic
majorities and minorities, between partisan insiders and outsiders? I readily
admit that there are no guarantees when it comes to democratic politics. Yet
there are also some signs that shared local contexts do matter and can sometimes
temper partisan divisions.283 Rural voters overwhelmingly support immigration
restrictions at the national level.284 Yet when it comes to immigrants within their
own communities, their views are often more nuanced and far less likely to be

281. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 21, 26 (Russell
E. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974).
282. See, e.g., LYN C. MACGREGOR, HABITS OF THE HEARTLAND: SMALL-TOWN LIFE IN
MODERN AMERICA 24–26 (2010); WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 74–75.
283. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 10 (suggesting that in daily rural life,
partisan positions are “nuanced” and “reflect[] the compassion that may be present for a neighbor who
has had an abortion or a best friend who is gay”).
284. See Katherine Fennelly & Christopher Federico, Rural Residence as a Determinant of Attitudes
Toward US Immigration Policy, INT’L MIGRATION, Mar. 2008, at 151, 172.
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in support of immigration enforcement.285 Rural voters are more likely to deny
the existence of man-made climate change.286 But when it comes to, say,
“fracking” or gas pipelines in their backyards, concerns about the environment,
property values, and public health often spark local opposition.287 Indeed,
unlikely alliances often arise when grounded upon a shared rural context.288
Moreover, we need to confront the fact that many of us, including those
in the so-called “establishment” have long harbored deep distrust of local
policymaking in general, and that in rural areas in particular. The elephant in
the room, of course, is the fear that, left to their own devices, rural residents will
make “bad” decisions. Fear of mob rule has long defined our perception of urban
democracy.289 In rural America, that same fear is compounded by worries that
racism, bigotry, and intolerance will rule the day.290 These feelings are no doubt
shaped in large part by the extent to which “local control” was used to justify
Jim Crow and racial segregation during the civil rights movement.291 But it was
also the lack of true local democracy, for Blacks and other racial minorities
especially, that contributed to their subordination.292 We should not believe that
285. See, e.g., CORNELIA BUTLER FLORA, JAN L. FLORA & STEPHEN P. GASTEYER, RURAL
COMMUNITIES: LEGACY + CHANGE 438–39 (5th ed. 2015) (describing community efforts in Sioux
City, Iowa, to limit local participation in federal immigration enforcement); Robert Samuels, The
GOP’s Condemnation of ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Is Surprisingly Awkward in Iowa, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-struggle-with-sanctuary-cities-iniowa/2016/01/31/575150f4-bb9c-11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html [https://perma.cc/D9EL-23HR
(dark archive)].
286. See, e.g., Megan Jula, Where American Communities Agree and Disagree on Climate Change, AM.
COMMUNITIES PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.americancommunities.org/where-americancommunities-agree-and-disagree-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/EJ5E-VW9W] (showing that
about half of rural residents believe that climate change is happening and man-made).
287. See, e.g., Jeanne Simonelli, Home Rule and Natural Gas Development in New York: Civil Fracking
Rights, 21 J. POL. ECOLOGY 258, 266–68 (2014); Eliza Griswold, A Pipeline, a Protest, and the Battle for
Pennsylvania’s Political Soul, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/dispatch/a-pipeline-a-protest-and-the-battle-for-pennsylvanias-political-soul [https://perma.cc/
A3ZE-YAZZ]; Josh Hicks, In Rural Western Maryland, Fracking Divisions Run Deep, WASH. POST (Feb.
26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/in-rural-western-maryland-frackingdivisions-run-deep/2017/02/26/3dc0c0d4-f791-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html
[https://perma.cc/43G5-T73F (dark archive)]; see also ELIZA GRISWOLD, AMITY AND PROSPERITY:
ONE FAMILY AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA 6 (2018).
288. See ZOLTÁN GROSSMAN, UNLIKELY ALLIANCES: NATIVE NATIONS AND WHITE
COMMUNITIES JOIN TO DEFEND RURAL LANDS 8 (2017).
289. See FRUG, supra note 167, at 44.
290. See WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 4; WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 141–
58.
291. See generally Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83 (explaining the use of “local control”
by city governments in the South to justify segregation and Jim Crow).
292. See, e.g., MARK SCHULTZ, THE RURAL FACE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: BEYOND JIM CROW
7–8 (2005). Indeed, Schultz argues that the weakness of state and local governments in the South was
in part an effort to preserve the private power of whites from being overtaken by the public power that
might be wielded by black residents. See id. at 175–76.
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empowering rural local governments as they are currently structured or
organized is the goal. Rather, the question is how all rural residents can be given
greater opportunity to participate in deciding the fate of their communities and
who belongs. Constitutional limits and substantive laws should still constrain
local policymaking, especially when it comes to the rights and interests of
minority residents. But none of this should be seen as incompatible with
expanding the democratic capacity of rural communities and making
participation at the local level more meaningful and responsive. And on the
policy choices themselves, perhaps some missteps should be tolerated along the
way. After all, as Bryan argues, “[r]eal democracies must be free to make
mistakes.”293
None of this is to say that local divisions do not exist. But when
controversial issues are brought down to the local level, the local context offers
a frame through which the terms of the debate are better understood. Moreover,
local political participation may itself be a transformative experience, especially
when it comes to learning how to deal with strangers as neighbors.294 It may
allow rural residents to cultivate what Frank Bryan calls, “the critical human
virtue of forbearance”—or, in other words, “how to suffer damn fools and to
appreciate the fact that from time to time you too may look like a damn fool in
the eyes of people as good as yourself.”295 In other words, rather than resorting
to higher levels of government, rural residents also need a way to negotiate and
resolve local tensions on their own. If rural residents are frustrated with
governmental solutions, it is probably because of the bureaucratic manner in
which many rural conflicts are addressed and the need to turn to state and
national policymakers who are detached from the local context in which these
conflicts arise. What is missing is a robust political process that is both local and
effective and rooted in the communities themselves. This is what an
invigoration of rural local governments might promise.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to imagine an effective response to the plight of rural
America without the involvement of the rural residents themselves. But it is
also unlikely for rural residents to be engaged if there is no outlet for political
action at the local level. The contemporary crisis in rural America involves more
than just rural decline. It is also a crisis of rural democracy, reflected in the
disaffection of rural voters and rooted in the legal structure of rural local
governments. Addressing the problems now facing rural America then requires

293. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 292.
294. See FRUG, supra note 167, at 10–11, 115–19; RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER:
PERSONAL IDENTITY & CITY LIFE 144–45 (1970).
295. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 288.
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more than just resources or efficient administration. It is also necessary, in my
view, to expand the role of rural local governments as effective forums for
democratic participation and meaningful vehicles for collective action.
What is required then is a willingness to reimagine the role of rural local
governments, their relationship with their residents, and their role in American
democracy. The goal should be how rural residents might once again be given
a greater sense of agency and control over their own lives and communities.
Though I offer several proposals, I do not conclude with a definitive set of
reforms. It is enough, in my eyes, to suggest that alternatives are possible. In
any event, I believe that any meaningful restructuring will need to be decided
upon by the residents themselves. The process through which rural local
governments is reformed is just as important as the outcome.
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